Action and Rationalization

Asarnow, Samuel

doi:10.1080/00048402.2021.1936093

Cited by 11 publications

References 39 publications

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Why reasons and reasoning don’t come apart

Kietzmann

2023

Synthese

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In recent years several philosophers have proposed what has come to be called the Reasoning View of normative reasons, according to which normative reasons are premises of sound reasoning. The reasoning view has come under some criticism, which chiefly consists in counterexamples that purport to show that something can be a premise of sound reasoning without intuitively being a normative reason, or can be a normative reason without being a premise of sound reasoning. I here consider and reject three examples that were recently put forward. Discussing them will allow me to clarify the Reasoning View in important respects.

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Why reasons and reasoning don’t come apart

Kietzmann

2023

Synthese

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The Contest Paradox

Eylon

2024

Sport, Ethics and Philosophy

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Against the Tyranny of Outcomes

Hurley

2024

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The book canvasses two sets of seemingly powerful arguments, the first that outcome-centered ethics cannot be wrong, the second that it cannot be right. It proceeds to undermine the arguments that outcome-centered ethics cannot be wrong, in the process providing additional support for the arguments that it cannot be right. Rooting out the mistaken grounding for outcome-centered ethics, it argues, involves rooting out the outcome-centered accounts of value, attitudes, reasons, and actions upon which the case for outcome-centered ethics depends, together with the considerations that have been offered to support them. The ethical and intuitive arguments for outcome-centered ethics are implausible (Chapters 2 and 3), the outcome-centered accounts of attitudes, reasons, and actions that form the cornerstone of the non-ethical argument for outcome-centered ethics are implausible (Chapters 4 and 5), and the considerations offered to shore up such outcome-centered accounts either themselves turn on the same equivocations that undermine the ethical arguments or depend upon highly controversial positions in metaphysics and the theory of action (Chapter 6). The result is a comprehensive argument for rejecting these outcome-centered accounts, in the process stepping outside of this toxic outcome-centered circle. The final chapter points to only a few of the many significant implications of this comprehensive rejection of the tyranny of outcomes, with particular focus upon our democratic and legal practices. It demonstrates that outcome-centered accounts lead agents away from the quest for good reasons of the right kind and towards appeal to the wrong kinds of reasons, and to bad reasons of the right kind.

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Action and Rationalization

Cited by 11 publications

References 39 publications

Why reasons and reasoning don’t come apart

Why reasons and reasoning don’t come apart

The Contest Paradox

Against the Tyranny of Outcomes

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