Action-dependent perceptual invariants: From ecological to sensorimotor approaches

Abstract

Ecological and sensorimotor theories of perception build on the notion of action-dependent invariants as the basic structures underlying perceptual capacities. In this paper we contrast the assumptions these theories make on the nature of perceptual information modulated by action. By focusing on the question, how movement specifies perceptual information, we show that ecological and sensorimotor theories endorse substantially different views about the role of action in perception. In particular we argue that ecological invariants are characterized with reference to transformations produced in the sensory array by movement: such invariants are transformation-specific but do not imply motor-specificity. In contrast, sensorimotor theories assume that perceptual invariants are intrinsically tied to specific movements. We show that this difference leads to different empirical predictions and we submit that the distinction between motor equivalence and motor-specificity needs further clarification in order to provide a more constrained account of action/perception relations.

Understanding Skill Acquisition: The Enactive vs. the Ecological Approach and Some Consequences

“…Taking it into account in the study and understanding of skill acquisition means to make a decision: to focus the attention either on the environment and its invariance, which is ecological, or on the relation of co-determination between the environment and the animal, which according to the The International Conference SKILLS 2011 000 -p. 3 founders of enactivism is enactive and not ecological in the Gibsonian sense.…”

“…They point out that from mutuality does not follow that the act of perceiving is direct in the Gibsonian sense of responding to invariants. Mossio & Taraborelli (2008) have illustrated the difference of the two approaches by pointing out that in contrast to ecological approaches, the enactive approach does not characterize perceptual invariants as properties of the sensory stimulation revealed through motion. A perceptual invariant in the enactive approach is a property of sensorimotor couplings that remains invariant throughout transformations.…”

“…The aim of the present contribution is to discuss the question whether the two approaches can be considered to be two sides of the same coin or whether they are two completely different ways of looking at direct perception, as Mossio and Taraborelli (2008) and especially Varela et al (1991) claim. This contribution aims at shedding light on how a positive answer to both questions can affect the understanding of skill acquisition.…”

“…On the other hand, the weak point of the mentioned definition consists in the fact that against the background of the state-of-theart in research on the ecological approach to direct perception, it is formulated in a way that does not allow to recognize the specifically ecological nature of the definition they propose, for the authors in their study refer to theoretical premises such as the possibilities and capabilities of action of the , which the ecological approach to direct perception shares with the so called enactive approach developed by Varela et al (1991). Without making some specific observations, which will be formulated in the following sections, the very ecological nature of the definition can be easily equated with the enactive approach, for some common tenets the two approaches share have led the ecological research to present the ecological approach as an articulation of the enactive approach [5, 6], as Mossio and Taraborelli (2008) observe.…”

Autonomy and Enactivism: Towards a Theory of Sensorimotor Autonomous Agency

“…What is a necessary condition here is not a specific sensory state, a perturbation or a structured or transformation-invariant sequence of them, of which the motor side is simply a consequence and, incidentally, an instrumental cause, as if other sources of sensory structuring could equally do-as Hurley has suggested is the case for sensory-dependency in ecological psychology (2001), see also Mossio and Taraborelli (2008). What is constitutive is the sensorimotor coordination itself.…”