Actionability Judgments Cause Knowledge Judgments

Turri, John; Buckwalter, Wesley; Rosé, David

doi:10.1002/tht3.213

Cited by 51 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“… For more on testing alternative models, see e.g., Iacobucci, Saldanha, and Deng (), Rose and Nichols (), Rose et al (), Rose and Nichols (), Rose (), and Turri et al (). …”

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confidence: 99%

Teleological Essentialism: Generalized

Rosé

Nichols

2020

Cognitive Science

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Natural/social kind essentialism is the view that natural kind categories, both living and non‐living natural kinds, as well as social kinds (e.g., race, gender), are essentialized. On this view, artifactual kinds are not essentialized. Our view—teleological essentialism—is that a broad range of categories are essentialized in terms of teleology, including artifacts. Utilizing the same kinds of experiments typically used to provide evidence of essentialist thinking—involving superficial change (study 1), transformation of insides (study 2), and inferences about offspring (study 3)—we find support for the view that a broad range of categories—living natural kinds, non‐living natural kinds, and artifactual kinds—are essentialized in terms of teleology. Study 4 tests a unique prediction of teleological essentialism and also provides evidence that people make inferences about purposes which in turn guide categorization judgments.

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“… For more on testing alternative models, see e.g., Iacobucci, Saldanha, and Deng (), Rose and Nichols (), Rose et al (), Rose and Nichols (), Rose (), and Turri et al (). …”

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confidence: 99%

Teleological Essentialism: Generalized

Rosé

Nichols

2020

Cognitive Science

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“…This model is a poor fit of the data, X 2 (1) = 13.51, p < .001, BIC = 8.73. For further details and some applications of GES, see Chickering, ; Rose, Livengood, Sytsma, & Machery, ; Rose & Nichols, , forthcoming; Rose, ; and Turri, Buckwalter, & Rose, .…”

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Teleological Essentialism

Rosé

Nichols

2019

Cognitive Science

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Placeholder essentialism is the view that there is a causal essence that holds category members together, though we may not know what the essence is. Sometimes the placeholder can be filled in by scientific essences, such as when we acquire scientific knowledge that the atomic weight of gold is 79. We challenge the view that placeholders are elaborated by scientific essences. In our view, if placeholders are elaborated, they are elaborated by Aristotelian essences, a telos. Utilizing the same kind of experiments used by traditional essentialists—involving superficial change (study 1), transformation of insides (study 2), acquired traits (study 3), and inferences about offspring (study 4)—we find support for the view that essences are elaborated by a telos. And we find evidence (study 5) that teleological essences may generate category judgments.

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“…Aside from providing a direct response to the skeptical argument, another strength of our proposal is that it coheres well with prior theoretical developments in epistemology. For instance, the approximation account naturally coheres with the theory that knowledge is importantly connected to action and practical interests (Fantl and McGrath 2009;Hawthorne 2004;James 1879James [1948; Locke 1690Locke [1975; Turri et al 2016;Turri and Buckwalter 2017). According to such views, whether a proposition is known depends partially on whether it is appropriate to treat that proposition as a reason for action in a particular situation.…”

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confidence: 75%

Knowledge and Truth: A Skeptical Challenge

Buckwalter

Turri

2019

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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It is widely accepted in epistemology that knowledge is factive, meaning that only truths can be known. We argue that this theory creates a skeptical challenge: because many of our beliefs are only approximately true and therefore false, they do not count as knowledge. We consider several responses to this challenge and propose a new one. We propose easing the truth requirement on knowledge to allow approximately true, practically adequate representations to count as knowledge. In addition to addressing the skeptical challenge, this view also coheres with several previous theoretical proposals in epistemology.

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Actionability Judgments Cause Knowledge Judgments

Cited by 51 publications

References 34 publications

Teleological Essentialism: Generalized

Teleological Essentialism: Generalized

Teleological Essentialism

Knowledge and Truth: A Skeptical Challenge

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