2016
DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.1606.05837
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Acyclic Games and Iterative Voting

Reshef Meir,
Maria Polukarov,
Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
et al.

Abstract: We consider iterative voting models and position them within the general framework of acyclic games and game forms. More specifically, we classify convergence results based on the underlying assumptions on the agent scheduler (the order of players) and the action scheduler (which better-reply is played).Our main technical result is providing a complete picture of conditions for acyclicity in several variations of Plurality voting. In particular, we show that (a) under the traditional lexicographic tie-breaking… Show more

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