Adaptability, Accountability and Sustainability: Intergovernmental Fiscal Arrangements in Canada

Statistics Canada has stopped publishing data on Canadian provincial government budgets, leaving researchers without the ability to examine the fiscal policy choices of those governments. We present a data set describing the budgets of each of the ten provinces spanning the period 1980/81 to 2013/14. Our data are similar to those published in the Department of Finance's Fiscal Reference Tables but provide a finer breakdown of revenue and expenditure into major categories. We illustrate the value of our data set by using it to examine long-term trends in provincial budgets that can be understood only with access to a long time series.

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“…With these data we hope we have made a contribution toward filling this gap. and Laurin (2015); and Eisen, Lamman, and Clemens (2015).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Canadian Provincial Government Budget Data, 1980/81 to 2013/14

Kneebone

Wilkins

2016

Canadian Public Policy

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“…The practice of intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) is particularly prevalent in Canadian federalism. IGAs result from political negotiations and can create legally binding obligations between the centre and provinces (Robson & Laurin, 2015). Intergovernmental forums aim to ensure that grant allocation decisions are based on the broader interests of national and subnational governments.…”

Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

The political economy of fiscal transfers: The case of Ethiopia

Yimenu

2024

Public Admin & Development

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This article examines the political economy of fiscal transfers in Ethiopia. Utilising an original data set spanning 1995–2020, as well as interviews and document analyses, the article illustrates how different factors interact to shape the distribution of grants. Statistical analysis indicates that population size is critical in determining regional grant shares. However, the analyses reveal a pattern of ethno‐regional favouritism in grant distributions during the early stages of Ethiopian federalism. During that period, opaque and centralised decision‐making processes, coupled with the dominant influence of the Tigray People's Liberation Front in the federal government, resulted in grant distribution deviating from principles of fiscal equity. Over time, this evolved into more fluid forms of negotiation influenced by intra‐party competition, dynamics of bargaining between the central and regional authorities, and regional assertiveness, collectively shaping the allocation of grants alongside the grant formula. The analysis highlights how economically and politically marginalised regions are disadvantaged, especially when their population is small. The absence of an independent grant agency means that political considerations continue to affect seemingly formula‐driven allocations. The Ethiopian case underscores how intra‐party bargaining and alignment along ethnic and regional lines undermine the effectiveness of formula‐based grant allocations in the absence of an independent and empowered grant agency.

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“…At the same time, the increase in the old-age dependency ratio will induce increased spending on health care, public drug programs, other social services and incomesupport programs including publicly funded pensions. In fact, according to Robson and Laurin (2015), age-sensitive expenditures are projected to increase from 13.0% of GDP to 15.6% of GDP between 2014 and 2035. Given the allocation of responsibilities between orders of government in Canada, these projected revenue and spending pressures could potentially be quite disruptive to fiscal balance across the federal and provincial governments.…”

Section: Challenges To Canadian Fiscal Federalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Canada

Tremblay

2023

The Forum of Federations Handbook of Fiscal Federalism

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Canada has evolved into one of the most fiscally decentralized federations in the world. Provinces enjoy considerable autonomy and play a central role in designing and implementing economic and social policies. This chapter outlines key features of Canadian fiscal federalism, especially the extensive decentralization of legislative responsibilities and taxation powers to provincial governments, the wide-ranging intergovernmental transfer system designed to maintain fiscal balance between orders of governments and among provinces, as well as the mechanisms in place to promote some harmonization of policies and cooperation among provinces. Current challenges to Canadian fiscal federalism are outlined including pressures on horizontal and vertical fiscal balance associated with demographic changes, rapidly increasing costs in the public health care system which have been intensified by the Covid-19 pandemic, persistent tensions associated with the geographic concentration of natural resources, as well as pressures on municipal finance resulting from ongoing urbanization and growing infrastructure needs, among others.

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Adaptability, Accountability and Sustainability: Intergovernmental Fiscal Arrangements in Canada

Cited by 13 publications

References 22 publications

Canadian Provincial Government Budget Data, 1980/81 to 2013/14

Canadian Provincial Government Budget Data, 1980/81 to 2013/14

The political economy of fiscal transfers: The case of Ethiopia

Canada

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