Adaptable individuals and innovative lineages

Abstract

One contribution of 15 to a theme issue 'Innovation in animals and humans: understanding the origins and development of novel and creative behaviour'. Subject Areas: evolutionKeywords: innovation, innovation and collective action, social innovations, innovation and social learning Author for correspondence: Kim Sterelny e-mail: kim.sterelny@anu.edu.au Adaptable individuals and innovative lineages Kim SterelnySchool of Philosophy, Australian National University, Coombs Building, Fellows Road, Acton, Canberra, 0200 ACT, Australia This paper suggests (i) that while work on animal innovation has made good progress in understanding some of the proximate mechanisms and selective regimes through which innovation emerges, it has somewhat neglected the role of the social environment of innovation; a neglect manifest in the fact that innovation counts are almost always counts of resource-acquisition innovations; the invention of social tools is rarely considered. The same is true of many experimental projects, as these typically impose food acquisition tasks on their experimental subjects. (ii) That neglect is important, because innovations often pose collective action problems; the hominin species were technically innovative because they were also socially adaptable. (iii) In part for this reason, there remains a disconnect between research on hominin innovation and research on animal innovation. (iv) Finally, the paper suggests that there is something of a disconnect between the theoretical work on innovation in hominin evolution (based on theories of cultural evolution) and the experimental tradition on human innovation. That disconnect is largely due to the theoretical work retreating from strong claims about the proximate mechanisms of human cultural accumulation. Hominin exceptionalism and its implicationsPrima facie, the capacity to innovate seems highly adaptive, especially in heterogeneous and/or fluctuating environments, as a means of responding successfully to new risks and opportunities, but also in more stable or uniform environments, as a means of easing the competitive squeeze on resources. The widespread existence of complex, canalized responses to environmental challenges documented in the niche construction and behavioural ecology literature-nest-building, burrow-making, migration in response to seasonal change-reinforces this impression [1]. For these behaviours presumably had their origins as innovations, prior to their coming under genetic control. Moreover, while as we shall see, some kinds of innovations may well be cognitively demanding, a basic capacity to innovate is almost certainly phylogenetically widespread, as it depends only on reinforcement learning: on an agent's capacity to register the environmental state it finds itself in; register the response it has produced in that state; and to evaluate the outcome of that response [2]. If innovating would often be adaptive, and if innovation often depends only on capacities that are ancient and widespread, then what explains the scope and limits ...

Animal and human innovation: novel problems and novel solutions

“…[ 78 ] and commentaries thereon). Like studies of spontaneous innovation, there are measures to address such problems [ 79 ], and several additional measures are suggested in papers within this issue (see [ 18 , 37 , 66 , 80 ]). For example, presentation of a variety of tasks that differ in difficulty can ensure a reasonable number of solutions are observed and that the consistency of innovativeness across tasks and contexts is established.…”

“…The aforementioned work on innovative problem-solving, and indeed much of the work on spontaneous innovation counts, has focused on what Sterelny (this issue: [ 80 ]) calls ‘games against nature’: solving ecological, not social problems. Sterelny [ 80 ] makes the important points that innovation also occurs in the social domain, that these social innovations may be particularly important, and even ‘ecological’ innovations occur in a social setting and have social consequences. As examples, competition may dampen the benefits of innovating if individuals cannot protect the pay-offs of their innovation, or observing others achieve rewards may promote extended exploration despite no immediate personal rewards.…”

Innovativeness as an emergent property: a new alignment of comparative and experimental research on animal innovation

“…Cross-generational transfer of knowledge, particularly without the need for direct contact between knowledgeable and naive, would have been facilitated by the evolutionary emergence of symbolic encoding of knowledge (via language and writing). Any of these processes, or others discussed by Sterelny [95] in the present theme issue, might have been added to the innovation toolkit of a recent descendant of a humanoid flexible stem.…”

Do as I sayandas I do: Imitation, pedagogy, and cumulative culture

“…27 Sterelny (2012) notes that "high fidelity flow depends on three factors: individual cognitive adaptation, adapted learning environments, and demographic support" (p. 59). See also Sterelny (2016). available, then, insofar as individuals are concerned, they have the capacity for cumulative culture.…”

“…Sterelny () notes that “high fidelity flow depends on three factors: individual cognitive adaptation, adapted learning environments, and demographic support” (p. 59). See also Sterelny ().…”