Adaptation to climate change can support unilateral emission reductions

Eisenack, Klaus; Kähler, Leonhard

doi:10.1093/oep/gpv057

Cited by 19 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 32 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The most obvious connection is of course to those recent papers which study mitigation and adaptation in a strategic context. Different from for instance Buob and Stephan (2011), Welsch (2011, 2012), Zehaie (2009), Eisenack and Kähler (2016), we allow for more than two players and study the formation of agreements. Different from some recent work by Barrett (2008) and Benchekroun et al (2016) who study IEAs, we work in a much more general framework, which also allows for the possibility of strategic complementarities in mitigation space, and derive most of our results analytically.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Climate agreements in a mitigation-adaptation game

Bayramoglu

Finus

Jacques

2018

Journal of Public Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We analyze the strategic interaction between mitigation (public good) and adaptation (private good) strategies in a climate agreement.We show that adaptation can lead to larger self-enforcing agreements, associated with higher global mitigation levels and welfare if it causes mitigation levels between different countries to be no longer strategic substitutes but complements. Thus, the fear that adaptation will reduce the incentives to mitigate carbon emissions may be unwarranted. We argue that our results extend to many important public goods. The purchase of private goods may not crowd out the provision of public goods, as this is commonly believed.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Climate agreements in a mitigation-adaptation game

Bayramoglu

Finus

Jacques

2018

Journal of Public Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…It is easy to show that denominator of both expressions is positive for all n ∈ [1, N ] if γc > 2N − 1, and that the numerator of ( 33) is also positive provided that αN/(2N − 1) > d. 17 Thus, these two constraints on parameter values guarantee that a s is positive for all n ∈ [1, N ] and also that e s is positive since αN/(2N − 1) > d implies that α > d.…”

Section: The Second Stage: the Pane Of The Adaptation Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

An Adaptation-Mitigation Game: Does Adaptation Promote Participation in International Environmental Agreements?

Borrero

Rubio

2021

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper studies how the investment in adaptation can influence the participation in an international environmental agreement (IEA) when countries decide in adaptation before they choose their levels of emissions. Two types of agreements are studied, a complete agreement for which countries coordinate their decisions on adaptation and emissions, and an adaptation agreement for which there is only coordination when countries decide their levels of adaptation. In both cases, we assume that the degree of effectiveness of adaptation is bounded from above, in order words, adaptation can alleviate the environmental problem, but it cannot solve it by itself leading the vulnerability of the country to almost zero. Our results show that the grand coalition could be stable for both types of agreement, but for extremely high degrees of effectiveness of adaptation. If this condition is not satisfied, the model predicts low levels of membership. The standard result of three countries for the complete agreement. For the adaptation agreement participation can be higher than three, but not higher than six countries. In any case, we can conclude that under reasonable values for the degree of effectiveness of adaptation, in our model adaptation does not promote participation in an IEA.

show abstract

“…In the extreme case of linear costs and concave benefits from abatement, only one agreement would undertake emissions abatement while all other countries do not abate any emissions regardless of their potential membership in other agreements. The findings of Eisenack and Kähler (2015), who show that individual countries with convex benefits from abatement may have increasing reaction functions so that emissions abatement becomes a strategic complement, give rise to the question about the strategic behavior of clubs that consist of such countries. In light of the previous analysis and the already existing economic literature we may conclude that climate clubs improve the outcomes of climate negotiations in some cases.…”

Section: Climate Clubsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Transnational environmental agreements with heterogeneous actors

Hagen¹,

Kähler²,

Eisenack³

2017

Economics of International Environmental Agreements

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper explores transnational environmental agreements on climate change. As the Paris agreement of 2015 contains no binding emission reduction targets for nation states, understanding other forms of cooperation as complements to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process becomes increasingly important. We thus aim to identify directions for further research on agreements with heterogeneous contracting parties. By building on empirical examples of emerging transnational environmental agreements, and on insights from the global governance literature, we discuss the scope and limits of the current economic literature on international environmental agreements. We argue that further game theoretical research would benefit from extending the analysis (i) to consider actors that are not nation state governments, and (ii) to consider multiple environmental agreements that are in force at the same time. We underpin this claim by suggesting two proposals for economic models that analyze climate clubs and city alliances. The results show that transnational environmental agreements can be individually rational and can improve the effectiveness of climate policies.

show abstract

Adaptation to climate change can support unilateral emission reductions

Cited by 19 publications

References 32 publications

Climate agreements in a mitigation-adaptation game

Climate agreements in a mitigation-adaptation game

An Adaptation-Mitigation Game: Does Adaptation Promote Participation in International Environmental Agreements?

Transnational environmental agreements with heterogeneous actors

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About