Adaptation to climate change: how does heterogeneity in adaptation costs affect climate coalitions?

Lazkano, Itziar; Marrouch, Walid; Nkuiya, Bruno

doi:10.1017/s1355770x16000097

Cited by 30 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…This appears to be a good benchmark because we could show that with adaptation larger coalitions can be stable, including the grand coalition. What would certainly be interesting is to depart from the assumption of symmetric players in or-der to capture better the current discussion whether industrialized countries should support developing countries not only in their mitigation but also their adaptation efforts (Lazkano et al (2016)) Will support in adaptation buy more mitigation? In this context one could assume that coalition members can pool their adaptation activities as a club, arriving an additional benefit compared to non-signatories from the cost-effective production of adaptation.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Climate agreements in a mitigation-adaptation game

Bayramoglu

Finus

Jacques

2018

Journal of Public Economics

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We analyze the strategic interaction between mitigation (public good) and adaptation (private good) strategies in a climate agreement.We show that adaptation can lead to larger self-enforcing agreements, associated with higher global mitigation levels and welfare if it causes mitigation levels between different countries to be no longer strategic substitutes but complements. Thus, the fear that adaptation will reduce the incentives to mitigate carbon emissions may be unwarranted. We argue that our results extend to many important public goods. The purchase of private goods may not crowd out the provision of public goods, as this is commonly believed.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Climate agreements in a mitigation-adaptation game

Bayramoglu

Finus

Jacques

2018

Journal of Public Economics

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“…These have brought about changes in the way smallholder farmers make decision to adapt to their environment (Ajetomobi et al, 2010). Lazkano et al (2016) describe adaptation as any activity that reduces climate change-induced damages. The literature captures well some adaptation practices used by farmers in different parts of Nigeria.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Climate Change Perception and Adaptation in Nigeria’s Guinea Savanna: Empirical Evidence From Farmers in Nasarawa State, Nigeria

Tarfa¹

2019

Appl. Ecol. Env. Res.

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Nigeria's guinea savanna produces the bulk of the food consumed in the country and climate change is adversely affecting agriculture in the area. Farmers in the area respond differently to climate change based on their perception. Yet, studies that systematically link farmers' perception on climate change to scientific data from meteorological stations are rare in Nigeria's guinea savanna. Much rarer are studies that consider the simultaneity in the adaptation decisions of the farmers. This study therefore aimed at analysing farmers' perception in comparison with meteorological data and the determinants of adaptation efforts of crop farmers in the areas with data from Nasarawa State of Nigeria. To achieve this aim, the study combined time-series data on climatic variables obtained from a weather station and cross-sectional data from 160 smallholder farmers selected from the area. The study applied descriptive statistics, trend analysis, and multivariate probit model in analysing data collected. The study showed reduction in volume of rainfall and significant increase in surface temperature with the farmers having firm perception of these changes. The farmers responded to the changes in temperature and rainfall by choosing adaptation strategies such as use of improved crop varieties, soil and water conservation, tree planting, changing dates of sowing and tillage options, irrigation, diversifying their means of livelihood, and farmland management. Interestingly, these strategies were complementary and farmers' socioeconomic and institutional characteristics significantly determined adaptation in the area. Therefore, considering farmers' socioeconomic characteristics and improving the institutions will help in future and planned adaptation efforts of governments.

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“…Moreover, we find that if the gains from full cooperation are large, the grand coalition is unstable. Lazkano et al (2016) as Barrett (2008) also look at the effects that differences in adaptation costs have on participation incentives. They present conditions under which adaptation can strengthen or weaken free-riding incentives.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Adaptation-Mitigation Game: Does Adaptation Promote Participation in International Environmental Agreements?

Borrero

Rubio

2021

SSRN Journal

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This paper studies how the investment in adaptation can influence the participation in an international environmental agreement (IEA) when countries decide in adaptation before they choose their levels of emissions. Two types of agreements are studied, a complete agreement for which countries coordinate their decisions on adaptation and emissions, and an adaptation agreement for which there is only coordination when countries decide their levels of adaptation. In both cases, we assume that the degree of effectiveness of adaptation is bounded from above, in order words, adaptation can alleviate the environmental problem, but it cannot solve it by itself leading the vulnerability of the country to almost zero. Our results show that the grand coalition could be stable for both types of agreement, but for extremely high degrees of effectiveness of adaptation. If this condition is not satisfied, the model predicts low levels of membership. The standard result of three countries for the complete agreement. For the adaptation agreement participation can be higher than three, but not higher than six countries. In any case, we can conclude that under reasonable values for the degree of effectiveness of adaptation, in our model adaptation does not promote participation in an IEA.

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Adaptation to climate change: how does heterogeneity in adaptation costs affect climate coalitions?

Cited by 30 publications

References 34 publications

Climate agreements in a mitigation-adaptation game

Climate agreements in a mitigation-adaptation game

Climate Change Perception and Adaptation in Nigeria’s Guinea Savanna: Empirical Evidence From Farmers in Nasarawa State, Nigeria

An Adaptation-Mitigation Game: Does Adaptation Promote Participation in International Environmental Agreements?

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