Additive multi-effort contests

Hausken, Kjell

doi:10.1007/s11238-020-09749-1

Cited by 8 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…Each player chooses the optimal reaction to the strategies of the other players from a profile of available strategies (Tadelis, 2013). NE is a condition where the expected payoff cannot be obtained if there is one of the players choose to deviate from selecting the NE (Barron, 2013) and also the optimal condition cannot be achieved by all players to apply all available strategies (Hausken, 2020). The players tend to exclude any available strategy that brings fewer costly strategies even though they prefer all of them.…”

Section: Multi-criteria Decision Making and Game Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Nash equilibrium selection using a hybrid two-player static game with trade-off ranking method

Ibrahim,

Jaini,

KU KHALIF

2024

Pak.j.stat.oper.res.

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The paper aims to suggest the ranking of an optimal solution when there exists more than one Nash equilibrium in the game theory solution concept. Many studies tend to merge the game theory with the multi criteria decision-making (MCDM) method to cater the real-situation problems. In the paper, a novel hybrid non-cooperative static game in game theory is combines with the trade-off ranking (TOR) method in MCDM. The proposed hybrid method is used to rank multiple Nash equilibria concerning some criteria. The methodology for both static game and TOR method are explained in the paper. The game theory model used is a two-player non-constant-sum static game. The proposed methodology is tested using international cooperation in Iran. The result suggests the ranking of the combined strategies using the proposed method.

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Section: Multi-criteria Decision Making and Game Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Nash equilibrium selection using a hybrid two-player static game with trade-off ranking method

Ibrahim,

Jaini,

KU KHALIF

2024

Pak.j.stat.oper.res.

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“…We apply the widely used ratio form contest success function [41], which is a plausible and widely used method for assessing two opposing players' success. See Hausken and Levitin [42], Hausken [43], and Congleton et al [44] for the use of the contest success function. In Period 1, Player 1 s expected contest success is p 11 and Player 2 s expected contest success is p 21 , i.e.,…”

Section: Periodmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Two-Period Game Theoretic Model of Zero-Day Attacks with Stockpiling

Wang

Welburn

Hausken

2020

Games

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In a two-period game, Player 1 produces zero-day exploits for immediate deployment or stockpiles for future deployment. In Period 2, Player 1 produces zero-day exploits for immediate deployment, supplemented by stockpiled zero-day exploits from Period 1. Player 2 defends in both periods. The article illuminates how players strike balances between how to exert efforts in the two periods, depending on asset valuations, asset growth, time discounting, and contest intensities, and when it is worthwhile for Player 1 to stockpile. Eighteen parameter values are altered to illustrate sensitivity. Player 1 stockpiles when its unit effort cost of developing zero-day capabilities is lower in Period 1 than in Period 2, in which case it may accept negative expected utility in Period 1 and when its zero-day appreciation factor of stockpiled zero-day exploits from Period 1 to Period 2 increases above one. When the contest intensity in Period 2 increases, the players compete more fiercely with each other in both periods, but the players only compete more fiercely in Period 1 if the contest intensity in Period 1 increases.

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Axiomatizing additive multi-effort contests

Hausken

2021

SN Bus Econ

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A rent seeking model is axiomatized where players exert multiple additive efforts which are substitutable in the contest success function. The axioms assume the sufficiency of exerting one effort, and that adding an amount to one effort and subtracting the same amount from a second equivalent substitutable effort keeps the winning probabilities unchanged. In contrast, the multiplicative Cobb–Douglas production function in the earlier literature requires players to exert all their complementary efforts. The requirement follows from assuming a homogeneity axiom where an equiproportionate change in two players’ matched efforts does not affect the winning probabilities. This article abandons the homogeneity axiom and assumes an alternative axiom where the winning probabilities remain unchanged when a fixed positive amount is added to all players’ efforts. This article also assumes a so-called summation axiom where the winning probabilities remain unchanged when a player substitutes an amount of effort from one effort into another effort. The summation axiom excludes multiplicative production functions, and furnishes a foundation for additive production functions.

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Additive multi-effort contests

Cited by 8 publications

References 30 publications

Nash equilibrium selection using a hybrid two-player static game with trade-off ranking method

Nash equilibrium selection using a hybrid two-player static game with trade-off ranking method

A Two-Period Game Theoretic Model of Zero-Day Attacks with Stockpiling

Axiomatizing additive multi-effort contests

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