Addressing Corruption in Post-Soeharto Indonesia: The Role of the Corruption Eradication Commission

Umam, Ahmad Khoirul; Whitehouse, Gillian; Head, Brian; Khan, M. Adil

doi:10.1080/00472336.2018.1552983

Cited by 29 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…The literature on the role of vested interests in undermining corruption reforms has noted that during the transition period, vested interest groups find new opportunities to reconstitute themselves to be “new but old players” in the political and economic reform processes (Hadiz, 2006; Whitehead, 2000). These groups involved interactions among old and also new elite politicians, government officials, law enforcement officers, business actors, including top‐tiered public, police force, and military officers who together consolidated the power of vested interests (Hadiz, 2013; Umam, Whitehouse, Head, & Khan, 2020). In the newly liberalized political‐economic environment, many economic elites have more deeply embedded in the political party system.…”

Section: Political‐economic Challenges Of Anti‐corruption Reformsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A weak government, with formal political power but limited capacity in practice to support anti‐corruption reforms, may be powerless before such a network. In such situations, the task of eradicating corruption will be highly vulnerable to manipulation and political pressures (Umam, 2014; Umam et al, 2020). In sum, the strength of vested interests is a pivotal factor determining either the success or failure of anti‐corruption policy implementation.…”

Section: Political‐economic Challenges Of Anti‐corruption Reformsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Second, while the KPK is seen as an “independent institution,” it is in fact highly politicized. Both cases highlighted the importance of political support of the highest political authority to provide adequate protection to the ACA’s anti‐corruption work (Quah, 2017; Umam et al, 2020). No matter how well‐financed the special anti‐corruption agency is, it will continually face challenges to its authority that must be repelled from government's leaders.…”

Section: Lessons On the Limits Of Anti‐corruption Reformsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Testing the Limits of Public Integrity: The Impact of Vested Interests and Countervailing Forces on Indonesia’s KPK

Umam

Head

2020

Asian Politics and Policy

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The establishment of Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) is as a crucial instrument for fighting systemic corruption and improving public integrity. However, corrupt forces in post-Soeharto Indonesia found opportunities to develop powerful coalitions built on the legacy of pre-reform power relationships. This article examines the extent to which the KPK's initiatives have been impeded by these vested interests. By examining two major cases involving conflicts against senior law enforcement officers-we identify some of the conditions where vested interests have exerted a significant influence in resisting anti-corruption efforts. Their greatest impact occurred when their attempts to exploit KPK's institutional weaknesses occurred in a permissive environment where political stakeholders were indecisive or unassertive. The fragmentation within civil society and independent media also seriously undermined on the capacity of anti-graft supporters to hold corrupt official to account in Indonesia.

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Section: Political‐economic Challenges Of Anti‐corruption Reformsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Political‐economic Challenges Of Anti‐corruption Reformsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Lessons On the Limits Of Anti‐corruption Reformsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Testing the Limits of Public Integrity: The Impact of Vested Interests and Countervailing Forces on Indonesia’s KPK

Umam

Head

2020

Asian Politics and Policy

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“…Kendati demikian, komitmen dari pemimpin politik untuk mendukung lembaga antikorupsi tidak mudah terjadi (Umam, 2018 Alhasil, friksi dan faksionalisme di internal KPK terus berlanjut. Proses pembusukan internal akibat friksi-friksi itu terus terjadi secara perlahan.…”

Section: Political Will Of the Top Political Leader: Kunci Sukses Danunclassified

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2019

Integritas

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The political commitment of the highest political leader in a country is the key to the success and failure of an anti-corruption institution body. In the first era of President Joko Widodo's leadership, the KPK faced a roller coaster of the agenda of eradication corruption. Various threats that present uncertainty about the future of the KPK has been carried out by external and internal forces of the KPK. This had a significant impact on the effectiveness of the KPK anticorruption engine. This article tries to explain and evaluate the quality of President Joko Widodo's first-period government support (2014-2019) to the KPK and how it impacts on the continuation of the anti-corruption agenda in Indonesia. This article concludes that economic development targets that require socio-political stability make anti-corruption work is less adequately addressed. As a result, the Corruption Eradication Commission was hit by a counterattack from various political-business interest groups. Responding to the situation, President Joko Widodo chose to play it safe and did not show a precise alignment on the KPK. In this period also, there was no visible cooperation that took root and made the eradication and prevention of corruption as the main agenda that was systematic and sustainable.

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“…One of the important development in Indonesia's fight against corruption is the establishment of The Corruption Eradication Committee (KPK) in 2002 (Umam, Whitehouse, Head, & Adil Khan, 2020). In the KPK annual report 2016 (KPK, 2017), there is information that during 2004-2016, there were 58 regional heads that have implicated in the corruption case.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fiscal Decentralization, Accountability and Corruption Indication: Evidence from Indonesia

Saputra

Setiawan

2021

J. Bina Praja

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In the Corruption Perception Index 2019, Indonesia ranks 90th among 180 countries (Transparency International, 2020). Indonesia still among the lowest rank in the corruption index. This index shows that corruption is an important issue for Indonesia. Therefore, the study aims at examining the determinants of corruption in Indonesia. This study focuses on two important aspects: fiscal decentralization and accountability. Since the enactment of Law Number 22 of 1999, which was then revised by Law Number 32 of 2004, the local government can manage fiscal. It is expected that local governments can use resources for the improvement of the wealth of the citizens. Further, the local government has a responsibility for using the resources. However, there are cases regarding corruption in local government in Indonesia. This study uses secondary data from local government financial statements to search the corruption indication, level of fiscal decentralization, and accountability. The study’s sample consists of 94 districts/cities on Java during the 2013-2015 period. The dependent variable in this study is an indication of corruption. Furthermore, the study divided corruption into three aspects: regional losses, potential regional losses, and revenue deficiency. The independent variables in this study were fiscal decentralization and accountability. This study uses multiple linear regression models to test the effect of fiscal decentralization and accountability on Indonesia’s corruption indicator. The result of the study shows that fiscal decentralization has a negative impact on corruption indication. The higher degree of fiscal decentralization minimizes the corruption indication in Java island. Meanwhile, fiscal decentralization has a negative effect on regional losses and revenue deficiency. Accountability has no significant on corruption indication. However, accountability has a negative impact on regional losses. In conclusion, both fiscal decentralization and accountability have curb corruption indication in the regional losses aspect.

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Addressing Corruption in Post-Soeharto Indonesia: The Role of the Corruption Eradication Commission

Cited by 29 publications

References 28 publications

Testing the Limits of Public Integrity: The Impact of Vested Interests and Countervailing Forces on Indonesia’s KPK

Testing the Limits of Public Integrity: The Impact of Vested Interests and Countervailing Forces on Indonesia’s KPK

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Fiscal Decentralization, Accountability and Corruption Indication: Evidence from Indonesia

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