Adjudication without Enforcement in GATT Disputes

Reinhardt, Eric

doi:10.1177/0022002701045002002

Cited by 111 publications

(72 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…The handful of cross-national analyses have focused primarily on the duration of the negotiation process itself (Michalopoulos 2002;Evenett and Primo Braga 2005;Yu and Wong 2008) or analyzed post-colonial states' economic patterns with a different theoretical focus, treating GATT/WTO membership only as a control variable rather than the question of interest (Head et al 2010). Rather than focusing on the timing of accession, scholars of international political economy have devoted the bulk of their efforts to measuring the effects of institutional membership on trade flows and national trade policies (Gowa and Kim 2005;Rose 2004;Goldstein et al 2007;Subramanian and Wei 2007), to clarifying the dynamics of trade round negotiations (Baldwin 2007;Jones 2009a, b;Odell 2009), and to explaining variation in the escalation, outcome, and effects of trade disputes (Busch 2000;Busch and Reinhardt 2001Reinhardt 2001;Guzman and Simmons 2002;Allee and Huth 2006;Kim 2008;Sattler and Bernauer 2008;Davis and Blodgett Bermeo 2009). Previous work has also explored the relationship of developing countries to the GATT/WTO (Pietras 1998;Finger and Winters 1998;Drahos 2003;Clapp 2006;Davis 2006;Patel 2008), as well as the potential for forum shopping in the settlement of trade disputes created by the overlapping jurisdictions of the GATT/WTO and preferential trade agreements (PTAs) (Davis 2006;Busch 2007;Naoi 2009).…”

Section: The Political Economy Of Gatt/wto Accessionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trade, institutions, and the timing of GATT/WTO accession in post-colonial states

Copelovitch

Ohls

2011

Rev Int Organ

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Prior to 1995, when the World Trade Organization (WTO) superseded the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a number of states took advantage of GATT Article XXVI:5(c), which allowed them-as former colonies or component territories of existing GATT members-to quickly and simply join the multilateral trade regime. The speed with which these post-colonial accessions took place, however, varied widely: some states joined immediately upon independence, while others joined much later. Still other post-colonial states passed on this opportunity, only to subsequently begin the longer, more onerous accession process required of other GATT/WTO applicants. Our paper seeks to explain this variation in the timing of post-colonial states' accession to the GATT/WTO. We argue that three key variables explain the timing of accession decisions: 1) a country's trade ties with existing member-states; 2) its existing preferential trade agreement (PTA) commitments; and 3) its domestic political institutions-specifically, the country's level of democracy. Furthermore, we argue that the effects of these variables are conditional upon each other: post-colonial countries with more extensive trade ties to existing member-states were more likely to accede rapidly under Article XXVI:5(c), but only under specific conditions-namely, when they had not already locked in ties with key trading partners through bilateral or regional PTAs, and when they were governed by a more democratic regime. We test this argument empirically using an original dataset of 61 post-colonial states from 1951 to 2004. Our results strongly Rev Int Organ (2012) 7:81-107 support this explanation of GATT/WTO accession and help to clarify the pattern of participation in the multilateral trading system that we have observed over the last half-century.

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Section: The Political Economy Of Gatt/wto Accessionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trade, institutions, and the timing of GATT/WTO accession in post-colonial states

Copelovitch

Ohls

2011

Rev Int Organ

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“…Meanwhile, an even larger literature was growing that studied all aspects of policy making in the European Union with an increasing degree of empirical and theoretical sophistication Schneider 2009;Thompson et al 2006). Simultaneously, a sophisticated empirical literature has emerged that studies dispute resolution in the WTO, the emergence of preferential trade agreements and the proliferation of bilateral investment treaties (Reinhardt 2001;Steinberg 2002;Davis 2003Davis , 2004Davis , 2012Busch and Reinhardt 2003;Mansfield and Reinhardt 2003;Büthe and Milner 2008;Mansfield and Milner 2012). Along the way, a number of anomalies have emerged that challenge the paradigm of explaining outcomes in terms of formal-legal treaty provisions, and scholars working in diverse areas have converged on an appreciation of the significance of informal governance in international organizations.…”

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confidence: 99%

Informal governance in international organizations: Introduction to the special issue

Stone

2013

Rev Int Organ

129

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International organizations have proliferated in recent decades. Virtually every issue of broad international concern is the subject of an international agreement that is administered by an international organization. Broad powers are delegated to some of these international agents, many of which exercise significant discretion and authority. International courts with broad jurisdiction and hundreds of more specialized judicial organs have been established to interpret a rapidly expanding body of international law. The organizational capacity of international governance has increased, while the capacity of domestic governance has declined in a range of failed states and contested territories. Meanwhile, the depth of policy coordination demanded by international agreements has led to an unprecedented level of international policy activism by some of the leading international organizations, including the IMF, the WTO, and the EU. Given the importance of what international organizations do, it is increasingly important to understand how international organizations actually work.Most of our theoretical models of international organizations are based on their formal attributes rather than on their behavior. Formal rules are important, of course, and generally set the parameters within which informal interactions take place, but shared expectations and extra-legal practices often modify or overrule written provisions. As a result, models based on legal provisions can be misleading. For example, there are numerous international organizations in which votes are never taken, or are almost always unanimous; nevertheless, analyses of their governance often focus on the equilibria of majority voting games. Since the game being played does not involve building minimum winning coalitions, however, voting models based on majority voting can shed little light on the degree of influence that powerful countries exert over decision making, or on the practical limits of that influence. Similarly, procedural models of EU legislation assume that the game being played follows the legal procedures prescribed in the EU treaties; but this is often not the Rev Int

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“…The dispute settlement system forms the central mechanism to enforce international trade law and embodies a high level of legalization in comparison with other international institutions. It has attracted wide attention from scholars in political science, economics, and law (e.g., Bagwell and Staiger 1999;Bown 2004b;Busch 2000;Guzman and Simmons 2002;Jackson 1997;Maggi 1999;Reinhardt 2001;Rosendorff 2005). While research has found no evidence of any bias in rulings against developing countries (Busch and Reinhardt 2003;Moon 2006), weak enforcement could arise through an earlier selection effect if developing countries do not file complaints to challenge violations.…”

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confidence: 99%