Advances in Animal Cognition

Vonk, Jennifer

doi:10.3390/bs6040027

Cited by 12 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…The field developed from comparative psychology, including the study of animal conditioning and learning (Shettleworth 2000. ) We now know that cognition comes in many forms across a huge diversity of nonhuman animal species (i.e., Shettleworth 1998;McMillan et al 2015;Vonk 2016;Allen 2017;Call et al 2017). The first studies on the complexity of animal minds were carried out by psychologists and traditionally centered on the phenomenon of learning (Kamil 1987;Hanus 2016;Maestripieri 2003), for instance, in a few model species such as rats and pigeons (Beach 1995;Hodos and Campbell 1969;Papini 2002).…”

Section: Current Hypotheses On Animal Cognitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Interestingly, however, we do not appear willing to apply the same explanatory rigor in seeking specific selection pressures or species-typical ecological affordances when it comes to cognitive abilities. No physiologist would consider human respiration or digestion as a particularly useful reference point to describe or understand the variety and complexity of animal metabolism, but many psychologists still appear to mark human cognition as the pivotal point from which any comparison with nonhuman systems ought to start (Shettleworth 2010;Premack 2007;Vonk 2016). It is therefore not surprising that the term "cognition" (and "intelligence", respectively), even in its broadest definition, is traditionally closely connected to "human cognition" (or "human intelligence").…”

Section: When Animals Outperform Humansmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Old and New Approaches to Animal Cognition: There Is Not “One Cognition”

et al. 2020

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Using the comparative approach, researchers draw inferences about the evolution of cognition. Psychologists have postulated several hypotheses to explain why certain species are cognitively more flexible than others, and these hypotheses assume that certain cognitive skills are linked together to create a generally “smart” species. However, empirical findings suggest that several animal species are highly specialized, showing exceptional skills in single cognitive domains while performing poorly in others. Although some cognitive skills may indeed overlap, we cannot a priori assume that they do across species. We argue that the term “cognition” has often been used by applying an anthropocentric viewpoint rather than a biocentric one. As a result, researchers tend to overrate cognitive skills that are human-like and assume that certain skills cluster together in other animals as they do in our own species. In this paper, we emphasize that specific physical and social environments create selection pressures that lead to the evolution of certain cognitive adaptations. Skills such as following the pointing gesture, tool-use, perspective-taking, or the ability to cooperate evolve independently from each other as a concrete result of specific selection pressures, and thus have appeared in distantly related species. Thus, there is not “one cognition”. Our argument is founded upon traditional Darwinian thinking, which—although always at the forefront of biology—has sometimes been neglected in animal cognition research. In accordance with the biocentric approach, we advocate a broader empirical perspective as we are convinced that to better understand animal minds, comparative researchers should focus much more on questions and experiments that are ecologically valid. We should investigate nonhuman cognition for its own sake, not only in comparison to the human model.

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Section: Current Hypotheses On Animal Cognitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: When Animals Outperform Humansmentioning

confidence: 99%

Old and New Approaches to Animal Cognition: There Is Not “One Cognition”

et al. 2020

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“…In the past decade there have been many calls for scientists to collaborate with zoos, leading to longer-term and formal associations between zoos and academic institutions [ 19 , 125 , 126 ]. Such partnerships can achieve common research goals, significantly expanding the potential for multi-species studies and providing zoos with empirical information about their animals, most of which can be fed back to improve management.…”

Section: Recommendations For Cognitive Bias Tests In Zoo Settingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cognitive Bias in Zoo Animals: An Optimistic Outlook for Welfare Assessment

Clegg¹

2018

Animals

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Simple SummaryCognitive bias testing has emerged as one of the most valid tools in measuring animals’ affective states, and while it has been extensively applied in farm and laboratory settings, only a few studies have taken place in zoos and aquaria. This review evaluates past cognitive bias studies on non-domesticated, “exotic” species kept in zoos or other settings and uses their experiences to make recommendations for establishing this research in zoos. The many variables inherent to functioning zoo environments will determine the scope and design of cognitive bias studies, but equally future efforts should be cognizant of the significant and unique benefits for the animals, managers, and scientists involved.AbstractCognitive bias testing measures how emotional states can affect cognitive processes, often described using the “glass half-full/half-empty” paradigm. Classical or operant conditioning is used to measure responses to ambiguous cues, and it has been reported across many species and contexts that an animal’s cognitive bias can be directly linked to welfare state, e.g., those in better welfare make more optimistic judgements. Cognitive bias testing has only recently been applied to animals and represents a key milestone in welfare science: it is currently one of the only accurate methods available to measure welfare. The tests have been conducted on many farm, laboratory, and companion animal species, but have only been carried out in zoo settings a handful of times. The aims of this review are to evaluate the feasibility of cognitive bias testing in zoos and its potential as a tool for studying zoo animal welfare. The few existing zoo cognitive bias studies are reviewed, as well as those conducted on similar, non-domesticated species. This work is then used to discuss how tests could be successfully designed and executed in zoo settings, which types of tests are most appropriate in different contexts, and how the data could be used to improve animal welfare. The review closely examines the many variables are present in the zoo which cannot be controlled as in other settings, termed here the Zoo Environment (ZE) Variables. It is recommended that tests are developed after consideration of each of the ZE Variables, and through strong collaboration between zookeepers, managers, and academic institutions. There is much unexplored potential of cognitive bias testing in the zoo setting, not least its use in investigating animal welfare in zoos. It is hoped that this review will stimulate increased interest in this topic from zoo managers, scientists, and industry regulators alike.

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“…Nearly 70 years on, the situation is markedly different; our research field has overcome this overspecialization and boasts a wide range of research questions across many different species (Beran, Parrish, Perdue, & Washburn, 2014;Shettleworth, 2009;Vonk, 2016). One prominent vein of this research has been structured around a subfield asking which cognitive abilities we might attribute to different species, which we will refer to as 'phenomenon-based comparative cognition'.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The illusion of science in comparative cognition

Bg¹,

Ostojić²

2019

Preprint

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A prominent vein of comparative cognition research asks which cognitive abilities may be ascribed to different species. Here, we argue that the current structure of comparative cognition makes it near impossible to evaluate the accuracy of many of the claims produced by the field's empirical research. We base this argument on six observations: i) the field is biased towards confirming more exceptional abilities in animals, ii) a likely high rate of false positive discovery, iii) the persistence of the bias towards more exceptional abilities, even in the presence of strong methodological criticism, iv) the absence of a formal method to assess evidence of absence of a cognitive ability, v) the ambiguity in definitions used to make claims, and vi) the small size of the research field. We then highlight how the widespread methodological and conceptual criticism in the comparative cognition literature does not facilitate scientific progress, rather it can impede it by creating an illusion of scientific rigour. Finally, we call for a reform of our research field that draws on recent developments in related fields and the Open Science movement. Now, fifteen months later, we have finally been able to put these thoughts to paper -the result of which is in front of you. When we are engrossed in a research programme, most of our time and effort is taken up by it. Taking a step back to evaluate the framework itself can be difficult. We hope that this paper may aid others in doing so if and when they decide to take that step.

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Advances in Animal Cognition

Cited by 12 publications

References 23 publications

Old and New Approaches to Animal Cognition: There Is Not “One Cognition”

Old and New Approaches to Animal Cognition: There Is Not “One Cognition”

Cognitive Bias in Zoo Animals: An Optimistic Outlook for Welfare Assessment

The illusion of science in comparative cognition

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