Advances in Synthetic Biology and Biosafety Governance

Abstract

Tremendous advances in the field of synthetic biology have been witnessed in multiple areas including life sciences, industrial development, and environmental bio-remediation. However, due to the limitations of human understanding in the code of life, any possible intended or unintended uses of synthetic biology, and other unknown reasons, the development and application of this technology has raised concerns over biosafety, biosecurity, and even cyberbiosecurity that they may expose public health and the environment to unknown hazards. Over the past decades, some countries in Europe, America, and Asia have enacted laws and regulations to control the application of synthetic biology techniques in basic and applied research and this has resulted in some benefits. The outbreak of the COVID-19 caused by novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 and various speculations about the origin of this virus have attracted more attention on bio-risk concerns of synthetic biology because of its potential power and uncertainty in the synthesis and engineering of living organisms. Therefore, it is crucial to scrutinize the control measures put in place to ensure appropriate use, promote the development of synthetic biology, and strengthen the governance of pathogen-related research, although the true origin of coronavirus remains hotly debated and unresolved. This article reviews the recent progress made in the field of synthetic biology and combs laws and regulations in governing bio-risk issues. We emphasize the urgent need for legislative and regulatory constraints and oversight to address the biological risks of synthetic biology.

Recent Strategies to Combat Biofilms Using Antimicrobial Agents and Therapeutic Approaches

“…Synthetic biology (SB) is a promising interdisciplinary research field that could be used to design and construct newer fabricated devices, artificial metabolic pathways, and organisms, or as well as reform current natural and biological systems, targeting critical problems in health, materials, energy, and the environment [ 168 ]. Using several synthetic biological approaches, it is now possible not only to engineer the desired proteins [ 169 ] but also to engineer the metabolic pathways [ 170 ] or even the biofilm structures [ 171 ].…”

Regulation and management of the biosecurity for synthetic biology

“…One is the United States Government Policy for Oversight of Life Sciences DURC released in 2012, and the other is the United States Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences DURC released in 2014. These two DURC policies aim to strengthen the oversight of life sciences research to identify potential DURC and implement risk mitigation [ 20 ]. Meanwhile, gain-of-function (GOF) research has also been focused on since a report was released on the creation of new viruses via genetically manipulated H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses; and these new viruses were found to be transmissible among mammals via respiratory droplets [ 39 ].…”

“…The biosafety risks and biosecurity risks of SynBio have been recognized since the field's inception and should have been regulated and managed in a sound way [ [17] , [18] , [19] ]. However, in most countries and regions, SynBio risks currently follow the regulation and management for GMO which has loopholes for the regulation of SynBio [ 20 ]. Thus, it is crucial to build a suite of regulations and management practices for SynBio risks to patch the holes.…”

Overstatements and Understatements in the Debate on Synthetic Biology, Bioterrorism and Ethics

“…We need to acknowledge that even though some risks connected with the production of pathogens based on advances within synthetic biology are very low, others may be higher. The risk of the production of completely new forms of pathogens seems very low at present, as it is almost impossible even for scientists with considerable time and resources to create such pathogens from scratch ( Li et al, 2021 , 1–14). Also some other risks are relatively low, for example, the risk that a terrorist group should succeed in making existing viruses more dangerous.…”