Adversarial Coordination and Public Information Design

Macroeconomic tail risk, currency crises and the inter‐war gold standard

“…The positive‐payoff condition, $$$ \hat{z} $$$, is a possible focal point for coordination in this space because it is this threshold that pins down behaviour in the limit as noise disappears. Alternatively, speculators may coordinate on the most aggressive rationalizable profile (i.e, $$$ {\pi}_s^{\ast } $$$), an assumption made by Inostroza and Pavan (2022), for example. Some political economy models (see Little et al 2015) argue that codified laws such as electoral thresholds are exogenous focal points for coordination under multiplicity.…”

Implementation via Information Design in Binary‐Action Supermodular Games

“…A recent paper of Li, Song, and Zhao (2023) solved for an optimal information structure in regime change games. Inostroza and Pavan (2022) showed that it was without loss to assume that optimal outcomes satisfied the perfect coordination property in regime change games, which also held for the optimal outcomes in Mathevet, Perego, and Taneva (2020) and Li, Song, and Zhao (2023). However, all these papers assume symmetric payoffs, where the perfect coordination property is less surprising 27 .…”

“…This property has been introduced in the context of regime change games by Inostroza and Pavan (2022).…”

“…In this literature, three papers are most relevant 26 Inostroza and Pavan. (2022) posed the question in the context of a class of regime change games (unlike us, they assumed that players had private information prior to the designer's information release).…”

“…In this literature, three papers are most relevant 26 Inostroza and Pavan. (2022) posed the question in the context of a class of regime change games (unlike us, they assumed that players had private information prior to the designer's information release). Mathevet, Perego, and Taneva (2020) also posed the question and solved for an optimal information structure in a two‐player two‐state symmetric example.…”