Beyond its highly publicized victories in Go, there have been numerous successful applications of deep learning in information retrieval, computer vision and speech recognition. In cybersecurity, an increasing number of companies have become excited about the potential of deep learning, and have started to use it for various security incidents, the most popular being malware detection.ese companies assert that deep learning (DL) could help turn the tide in the ba le against malware infections. However, deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to adversarial samples, a aw that plagues most if not all statistical learning models. Recent research has demonstrated that those with malicious intent can easily circumvent deep learning-powered malware detection by exploiting this aw.In order to address this problem, previous work has developed various defense mechanisms that either augmenting training data or enhance model's complexity. However, a er a thorough analysis of the fundamental aw in DNNs, we discover that the e ectiveness of current defenses is limited and, more importantly, cannot provide theoretical guarantees as to their robustness against adversarial sampled-based a acks. As such, we propose a new adversary resistant technique that obstructs a ackers from constructing impactful adversarial samples by randomly nullifying features within samples. In this work, we evaluate our proposed technique against a real world dataset with 14,679 malware variants and 17,399 benign programs. We theoretically validate the robustness of our technique, and empirically show that our technique signi cantly boosts DNN robustness to adversarial samples while maintaining high accuracy in classi cation. To demonstrate the general applicability of our proposed method, we also conduct experiments using the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets, generally used in image recognition research.
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