Adverse selection with endogenous information in insurance markets

Genetic testing when there is a mix of compulsory and voluntary health insurance

“…In this case they will not undertake preventive measures. Doherty and Thistle (1996) show that if the insurer does not expect consumers to be tested, no Nash equilibrium exists. Doherty and Thistle do not consider the availability of preventive measures.…”

“…In accordance with initiatives in many countries, we also impose the institutional constraint that insurers have no access to genetic information. Our analysis makes use of results from Doherty and Thistle (1996). In contrast to what is assumed in most of the literature, Doherty and Thistle (1996) assume that a consumer's information about his risk status is endogenous.…”

Negligence, Ignorance and the Demand for Liability Insurance

“…Since potential injurers can choose to remain rationally ignorant or can choose to learn about the risks they face, our work is related to previous research on endogenous information in insurance markets (Crocker and Snow, 1992, Doherty and Thistle, 1996, 5 Ligon and Thistle, 1996a. This earlier work considered pure adverse selection economies, whereas we allow potential injurers to take actions to reduce the probability of loss.…”

Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets

“…Despite the intensive political discussion, the theoretical literature on genetic testing and health insurance has remained rather limited (Tabarrok (1994), Doherty and Thistle (1996), Doherty and Posey (1998), Strohmenger and Wambach (2000), Andersson (2001), Hoel and Iverson (2002), Hoy et al (2003), Hoel et al (2006)). All of these papers consider Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) type static one-period insurance markets and analyze the effects of genetic testing on the risk categorization of individuals in the spirit of Hoy (1982).…”