Advertising and Welfare

Dixit, Avinash; Norman, Victor

doi:10.2307/3003609

Cited by 327 publications

(201 citation statements)

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“…Well-known discussions of the welfare effects of advertising, such as Dixit and Norman (1978) and Becker and Murphy (1993), do not take into account the role of media firms as transmitters of advertising. 4 An early attempt to do so is in Spence and Owen (1977).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competition for Viewers and Advertisers in a TV Oligopoly

Kind

Nilssen

Sørgard³

2007

Journal of Media Economics

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© Dette eksemplar er fremstilt etter avtale med KOPINOR, Stenergate 1, 0050 Oslo. Ytterligere eksemplarfremstilling uten avtale og i strid med åndsverkloven er straffbart og kan medføre erstatningsansvar. CASE -CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES IN ECONOMICSCASE -Centre for Advanced Studies in Economics -is a joint centre for The Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH), The Institute for Research in Economics and Business Administration (SNF) and The University of Bergen (UiB). Research at CASE includes all types of issues based on economic theory and method, and researchers at the Centre have particular expertise within the areas of international trade, industrial economics, labour market economics, factor mobility, economic integration, industrial policy, international macro economics, tax policy, international transport and maritime research. International Trade and Tax PolicyResearch within this area focuses mainly on issues related to international trade and tax policy, and has generally been dominated by projects aiming to provide increased insight into global structural issues and the effect of regional economic integration. The staff have particular expertise within the fields of international real economics (trade, factor mobility, economic integration and industrial policy), international macro economics and international tax policy, but are also actively involved in projects relating to public economics and industrial policy. Industrial EconomicsIndustrial economics is another central research area at the Centre, within which SNF has longstanding traditions. A series of individual studies have been carried out through large framework programmes funded by the Research Council of Norway and major Norwegian companies. The focal point of these studies is strategic company behaviour in industries with few players, where competition effects are modelled and analysed. The studies have provided important structural and empirical insights into deregulation effects within industries such as airlines, telecommunications and energy and have provided significant input to Norwegian competition policies. The research group includes a number of researchers at both UiB and NHH and has an extensive international network. Labour Market EconomicsThe labour market group focuses on mainly two research areas. One central topic is education and family economics. An important aspect is to analyse the production process for human capital; the importance of family, neighbourhood, preschools and schools for adult education and labour market experience. The other main topic is to analyse firm performance and firm restructuring. These analyses include firm performance, adjustment costs, costs of displacement including health costs, the effect of technological change and international trade, and analysis of organisational change. Human ResourcesCASE is a network-based organisation whose staff consists mainly of professors at Department of Economics at NHH and UiB as well as leading international economists who are ...

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competition for Viewers and Advertisers in a TV Oligopoly

Kind

Nilssen

Sørgard³

2007

Journal of Media Economics

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“…This is a well known microfoundated problem that many models share. Another problem, initially pointed out by Dixit and Norman (1978), arises when advertising shifts the individual utility function from which the demand curve is derived. The usual criticism regarding the welfare comparison also applies to the profit comparisons that we will carry out in our model.…”

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confidence: 99%

Advertising and endogenous exit in a differentiated duopoly

Mantovani¹,

Mion²

2006

Recherches Économiques De Louvain

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“…However, a consistent comparison of the size of the consumer surplus for different values of F is hindered by the fact that the utility function of each consumer depends on x, which might take on different values depending on the size of F. In turn, this hinders an analysis of the social welfare properties of the equilibrium as well. The problematic nature of welfare analyses in models with endogenously shifting preferences is well-known in the literature on persuasive advertising, see Dixit and Norman (1978). Dixit and Norman's approach is the following: compare welfare before and after the change of preferences using both the unchanged and the changed preferences for the consumer surplus.…”

Section: Remark 1 Let Us Represent the Total Equilibrium Costs Of Thementioning

confidence: 99%

Environmental groups in monopolistic markets

Heijnen

Schoonbeek

2007

Environ Resource Econ

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We examine a market in which a monopolistic firm supplies a good. The production of the good causes damage to the environment. Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their disutility of the environmental damage. An environmental group can enter the market and set up a campaign in order to influence consumers' preferences. We characterize the equilibrium of the resulting entry-deterrence game and investigate its properties. It turns out that the aggregated environmental damage is lowest if the firm is able to deter entry of the environmental group and, moreover, the fixed entry cost of the environmental group is small enough.

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Advertising and Welfare

Cited by 327 publications

References 0 publications

Competition for Viewers and Advertisers in a TV Oligopoly

Competition for Viewers and Advertisers in a TV Oligopoly

Advertising and endogenous exit in a differentiated duopoly

Environmental groups in monopolistic markets

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