Aesthetic judgements and motivation

Abstract

Are aesthetic judgements cognitive, belief-like states or non-cognitive, desirelike states? There have been a number of attempts in recent years to evaluate the plausibility of a non-cognitivist theory of aesthetic judgements. These attempts borrow heavily from Non-cognitivism in metaethics. One argument that is used to support metaethical Non-cognitivism is the argument from Motivational Judgement Internalism.It is claimed that accepting this view, together with a plausible theory of motivation, pushes us towards accepting Non-cognitivism. A tempting option, then, for those wishing to defend Aesthetic Non-cognitivism, would be to appeal to a similar argument. However, both Caj Strandberg and Walter Sinnott-Armstong have argued thatInternalism is a less plausible claim to make about aesthetic judgements than about moral judgements by raising objections against Aesthetic Internalism. In this paper I will argue that both of these objections can be raised against Internalism about moral judgements as well. As a result, Internalism is no less plausible a claim to make about aesthetic judgements than about moral judgements. I will then show how a theory of Internalism about normative judgements in general is capable of avoiding both of these objections.

The Amoralist and the Anaesthetic

“…This seems to be the direction suggested in Archer, and . He defends a rationalizing internalism for first‐personal, all‐things‐considered normative judgments.…”

“…I am not the first to examine aesthetic internalism (see Sinnott‐Armstrong, ; Strandberg, and ; and Archer, and ), but my view and purpose are different. I will make these differences explicit as they arise.…”

“…Archer, , takes a similar approach, but unlike me, uses it to defend a version of normative internalism.…”

Defending aesthetic internalism: Liking, loving, and wholeheartedness

“…Smith also credits SimonBlackburn (1984) and MarkJohnston (1989), among others, with similar accounts.13 Compare to Caj Strandberg's formulation: 'Necessarily, if a person S judges that an object is aesthetically valuable, then she is at least somewhat motivated to acquaint herself with it, given that she is practically rational'(Strandberg (2016): 39, emphasis in original). Alfred Archer's version includes not only a rationality condition but also aesthetic competence(Archer (2017): 660). 14 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pushing me to revise and expand this discussion.…”