Aesthetic obligations

Abstract

Are there aesthetic obligations, and what would account for their binding force if so? I first develop a general, domain-neutral notion of obligation, then critically discuss six arguments offered for and against the existence of aesthetic obligations. The most serious challenge is that all aesthetic obligations are ultimately grounded in moral norms, and I survey the prospects for this challenge alongside three non-moral views about the source of aesthetic obligations: individual practical identity, social practices, and aesthetic value primitivism. I conclude by raising questions for further work in this area. 1 | INTRODUCTION "I must hear the new Lady Gaga album." "You have to play all the notes." "He shouldn't wear those colors together." "We ought to fund more arts programs." "The moral rights of the author have been asserted." 1 Can sentences like these express genuine normative requirements, or obligations? If so, what could account for their binding force? These are the two major questions about aesthetic obligations: whether there are any and what their source would be if so. Philosophers tend to have two motivations, broadly speaking, for asking these questions. One is defensive, aiming to resist the pervasiveness of the moral. Obligations, and normativity more generally, have historically been theorized primarily in the moral domain, and the fact that its commands seem to have such powerful force implicitly prioritizes morality on the theoretical agenda. If there are aesthetic obligations, then that would put the aesthetic domain on a par with morality, at least in that respect. But this is a dubious motivation, as it is increasingly recognized that-or at least seriously debated whether-obligations can arise in many non-moral normative domains, including etiquette, the law, prudence, and epistemology. 2 And it is in any case possible that moral obligations always defeat non-moral obligations. 3 A better, second motivation is therefore simply to explore the landscape internal to aesthetics as a normative domain, before attempting to make cross-domain comparisons. We might wonder: what kind of aesthetic life do we have most reason to live? 4 To what extent are aesthetic choices even governed by normative considerations? Do any of those considerations ever have the force of obligations? Asking whether there are any aesthetic obligations requires knowing about their alleged contents: what are these purported obligations of or to? One initial possibility to set aside is that aesthetic obligations are obligations of

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