Afghanistan & Iraq: Iraq - A Vote Against Sectarianism

Abstract

Although many Iraqi parties continue to be organized along religious or ethnic lines, both the tone and the results of the 2010 parliamentary election campaign show that most Iraqi voters prefer a broader national agenda over narrow sectarian appeals.

Sectarian identity and national identity in the Middle East

“…The standard narrative regarding this shift mistakenly posits it as a case of ethno‐religious loyalties receding in favour of nationalism thereby repeating the flawed dichotomization of sectarian and national identities and misreading both in the process. For example, in describing the shifting electoral landscape, a study in the Journal of Democracy in the election year of 2010 mistakenly looks to the nationalism‐versus‐sectarianism dichotomy in search of causality (Dawisha, ). Hence, incumbent Prime Minister Nouri al‐Maliki is portrayed as breaking away from the grand Shi'a alliance of 2005, “ … denigrating its sectarianism and running on a strict Iraqi nationalist platform” (Dawisha, , p. 27).…”

“…For example, in describing the shifting electoral landscape, a study in the Journal of Democracy in the election year of 2010 mistakenly looks to the nationalism‐versus‐sectarianism dichotomy in search of causality (Dawisha, ). Hence, incumbent Prime Minister Nouri al‐Maliki is portrayed as breaking away from the grand Shi'a alliance of 2005, “ … denigrating its sectarianism and running on a strict Iraqi nationalist platform” (Dawisha, , p. 27). Yet the grand Shi'a alliance, and indeed all electoral coalitions in Arab Iraq, consistently employed the vocabulary of Iraqi nationalism—including the mandatory denunciations of sectarianism.…”

“…As such, the fact that in 2010 the grand Shi'a electoral coalition declared its “ … own abhorrence of sectarianism and pledged itself to ‘preserve the unity and honour of Iraq' …” (Dawisha, , p. 34) is not evidence of a shift to a nationalist line but an example of boilerplate mainstream Iraqi political rhetoric that is seldom deviated from even at the heights of sect‐coded violence in 2006–2007. In the same article, Maliki's coalition is portrayed as adopting “… an Iraqi nationalist orientation which set it apart from other heavily Shi'a groupings.” (Dawisha, , p. 30). Here, we see how the dichotomization of national and sectarian can end up stigmatizing sectarian identity.…”

Beyond structure and agency: Rethinking political identities in Iraq after 2003

“…As such, he not only withdrew his symbolic, social, and cultural capital from the United Iraqi Alliance but also pushed for a change to the electoral system that would favour more voter choice. Sistani's withdrawal of support and the reassertion of the autonomy of the political field from the religious field saw the Shi'a Islamist parties split into two competing factions, the original Iraqi National Alliance and the coalition built by the then Prime Minister, Nuri al Maliki, State of Law (Dawisha, , p. 34). This fracturing of social and symbolic capital in the political field also saw those seeking to interpolate and mobilise Iraqi Sunnis specifically as Sunnis become less effective.…”

The Iraqi Identity: An Alternative History of Identity in Iraq

“…Iraklı olmaktan az ya da çok gurur duyduklarını belirtirken, Temmuz 2007'de yapılan ankette Iraklı olmaktan gurur duymayan katılımcı oranı yalnızca yüzde 1'di 91. Bu arada, ülkenin içerisinde bulunduğu iç savaş ortamında Temmuz 2007'de Irak millî futbol takımının Sünni figürleri buna dâhil edememiştir) 95. Dahası, daha önce Şiiler için güneyde özerk bir bölge oluşturulmasının propagandasını yapan el-Hekim kanadı, şimdi Bağdat'ta güçlü bir hükümetten yana tercihini ilan etmiş, 2010 seçimlerine giderken federalizmi açıkça savunan tek grup ise Kürtler olmuştur 96.…”