Africa–India nuclear cooperation: Pragmatism, principle, post-colonialism and the Pelindaba Treaty

Abstract

The United StatesÁIndia nuclear agreement, announced in 2005, was a first step in the process to normalise India's international nuclear relations despite the fact that India is not a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Africa is largely seen as a uranium supplier rather than nuclear power producer in the world nuclear order. The position that African states take towards AfricaÁIndia nuclear cooperation, uranium supply to India in particular, is informed by two seemingly contrasting factors, namely economic and political pragmatism on the one hand, and non-proliferation imperatives and norms on the other. The African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty, also referred to as the Pelindaba Treaty, prohibits uranium and nuclear-related exports to states without comprehensive safeguards of their nuclear facilities, but the case of India is still open for interpretation. Africa and India's shared post-colonial consciousness, manifesting in their historical ties, membership of the Non-Aligned Movement and SouthÁSouth cooperation, is often regarded as another factor facilitating AfricaÁIndia nuclear relations. A more critical view points to the different notions of post-coloniality in Africa and India, resulting in different approaches to nuclear non-proliferation that constrain their nuclear relations.

Nuclear diplomacy as niche diplomacy: South Africa's post-apartheid relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency

“…This was an important development, as the IAEA's verification and the country's renewed membership on the board added weight to its nuclear diplomacy and paved the way for, among other successes, South Africa's ratification and the entry into force of the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (the Pelindaba Treaty), discussed in full elsewhere. 47 Once back as a board member, South Africa again sought to improve the representation of developing countries on the board, calling for a 'stronger voice for developing countries' in line with South Africa's stated foreign policy, as well as its self-proclaimed identity as a bridge between developed and developing countries. 48 South Africa's stated foreign policy included, inter alia:…”