Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument

Gerhart, Gail M.; Chabal, Patrick; Daloz, Jean-Pascal

doi:10.2307/20049597

Cited by 235 publications

(36 citation statements)

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“…Hence, an in-depth understanding of forestland governance has two fundamental dimensions: the role of formal and informal strategies employed by some actors to force or resist domination (politics) on the one hand, and the strengths and weaknesses of various arrangements between government entities, business groups and other actors including civil society organisations (policies) concerning the governance of forest-related resources, on the other. A thorough investigation of these fundamental dimensions is particularly relevant in postcolonial and neo-colonial societies like those in Africa which have experienced strong social oppression (Mbembe 2001), manipulation of political (dis)order (Chabal and Daloz 1999) and contestation over the legitimacy of statehood (Hagman and Péclard 2010).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Forestland policies and politics in Africa: Recent evidence and new challenges

Ongolo

Gießen²,

Karsenty

et al. 2021

Forest Policy and Economics

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mentioning

confidence: 99%

Forestland policies and politics in Africa: Recent evidence and new challenges

Ongolo

Gießen²,

Karsenty

et al. 2021

Forest Policy and Economics

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“…Further -as detailed in a large political science literature on democracy in developing country contexts (e.g., Chabal and Daloz 1999), and recently highlighted by Acemoglu et al (2013) and Albertus and Menaldo (2014) a de jure democracy may be congruent with de facto concentration of power in the elites' hands, leading to "captured democracy" with little redistribution.…”

Section: Democracy Affects Income Inequalitymentioning

confidence: 94%

Reinvestigating the Reciprocal Relationship between Democracy and Income Inequality

Knutsen

2015

Review of Economics and Institutions

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Few social science relationships have spawned as much interest -- or as many elaborate theoretical models and arguments -- as that between democracy and income inequality. However, the empirical literature has generally employed statistical models based on problematic assumptions, and has produced quite mixed results. Hence, this paper makes an important empirical contribution by applying models that, for instance, account for endogeneity biases and control for country--specific effects. Despite being correlated, there is very little evidence of any effect of income inequality on level of democracy once employing appropriate model specifications. Furthermore, there is no robust evidence that inequality systematically affects either democratization prospects or democratic stability. In contrast, there is evidence that democracy reduces income inequality when inequality is proxied by share of income going to wages. However, also this effect is sensitive to the choice of inequality measure. Democracy does, for instance, not reduce inequalities in disposable household incomes.

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“…Existing scholarship delineates various drivers of public‐facing corruption, including material need (Alexandre, 2018; Becker & Stigler, 1974), deeply entrenched norms of social interaction (Bayart et al, 1999; Blundo & Sardan, 2006; Chabal & Daloz, 1999; Rose‐Ackerman, 1999; de Sardan, 2008), organizational culture (Baaz & Olsson, 2011; Sanchez de la Sierra, 2017; Verma, 1999); and personal greed (Bauhr, 2017; Hasty, 2006).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The godfather provides: Enduring corruption and organizational hierarchy in the Kenyan police service

Mutahi¹,

Micheni

Lake

2022

Governance

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Despite government commitments to mitigate corruption and strengthen mechanisms of accountability in state security sectors, reform efforts frequently fail to curb illegal practices by state agents. Scholars offer explanations that range from deeply embedded societal norms of appropriate behavior to rational accounts emphasizing the individualized benefits corruption can offer. Using a case study of the Service Standing Orders in Kenya's National Police Service however, we build on the work of Persson et al.'s analysis to show how corrupt practices on the part of street-level agents are reinforced within organizational hierarchies, through institutionalized-rather than personalized-incentives and obligations. As a result, policy innovations that do not explicitly identify the countervailing incentives created through internal command structures are likely to miss potentially fruitful avenues for institutional reform.

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Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument

Cited by 235 publications

References 0 publications

Forestland policies and politics in Africa: Recent evidence and new challenges

Forestland policies and politics in Africa: Recent evidence and new challenges

Reinvestigating the Reciprocal Relationship between Democracy and Income Inequality

The godfather provides: Enduring corruption and organizational hierarchy in the Kenyan police service

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