Afro-Communitarianism and the Question of Rights

Abstract

We argue that Menkiti and Gyekye – the forerunners in Afro-communitarianism, to different extents both trivialise the notion of human rights. While Menkiti prioritises community and denies human rights, Gyekye who upholds human rights subsumes these to the community. We contend that both are however mistaken in their trivial conceptions of human rights. To clarify the confusion, we propose that the notion of rights in Afro-communitarianism can have two possible senses namely, rights as participatory and rights as entitlements and that the failure to recognise these senses was what led Menkiti to a fringed position and Gyekye to a difficult position. We then conclude that Afro-communitarianism, in both Menkiti and Gyekye harbours a certain notion of rights contrary to Menkiti’s assumption but it is not one that accommodates the idea of inalienability contrary to Gyekye’s suggestion.

Can Afro-Communitarianism Be Useful in Combating the Challenge of Human Interaction Posed by the COVID-19 Pandemic?

“…In this way, it is an ideology with pragmatic relevance. The relevance of Afro-communitarianism can be attested to by the extensive works written by certain African philosophers and scholars, such as Ifeanyi Menkiti [ 6 ], Jonathan Chimakonam [ 7 ], Chimakonam and Victor Nweke [ 8 ], Bernard Matolino [ 9 ]. These scholars have employed Afro-communitarianism to address certain burning issues, such as personhood, democracy, human dignity, rights, etc., confronting contemporary Africa and the entire human race.…”

Grounding African political theory on afro-communitarianism: arguments and implications

“…In connection, if right of entitlement is linked to a personhood granted by the community where an individual belongs, it affirms the suspicion that such community would aid the flourishing of non-members living in it. Chimakonam and Nweke (2018) do not see anything wrong in this conception of rights and its notion of personhood. Their concern is that Menkiti's zealousness to discount the ownership of rights of individuals and support the existence of community rights trivializes and consequently defaces the notion of human rights and passes African thought as incompatible with the idea of rights.…”

“…Objections to Menkiti's political philosophy by critics have taken the direction of assessing his view on rights and personhood in African thought. Chimakonam and Nweke (2018) accuse Menkiti of trivializing the question of rights in his conceptions of Afrocommunitarianism and personhood. Chimakonam and Nweke (2018) note that Menkiti's conception of persons suggests the existence of two kinds of rights.…”

“…Chimakonam and Nweke (2018) accuse Menkiti of trivializing the question of rights in his conceptions of Afrocommunitarianism and personhood. Chimakonam and Nweke (2018) note that Menkiti's conception of persons suggests the existence of two kinds of rights. The first is known as participatory rights and the other as entitlement rights.…”

“…A conception, they argue, is not devoid of the idea of individual rights. Chimakonam and Nweke's (2018) conception of personhood retains the community and its contribution. They argue that being a person, in the Afro-communitarian interpretation, begins with being an offspring of the community that confers the personhood status, an idea traceable to Mbiti and other conservatives.…”