After Exception: Carl Schmitt's Legal Institutionalism and the Repudiation of Exceptionalism

Abstract

In the most classical and abstract sense, the exception is the "miraculous" moment of the sovereign decision where the borders between the inside and the outside are fixed through the identification of the enemy. This is a Schmittian legacy that a growing number of theoretical paradigms today look at in order to either build on it or to debunk it. For some interpreters, exceptionalism is a perceptive analysis of the way political power takes hold of society; for others, it is a misleading and mystifying hypothesis that may even end up justifying the increasing overuse of emergency powers all over the world.Whether or not exceptionalism has something sensible to say about today's politics, in this article we will argue that Carl Schmitt himself, the recognized father of this paradigm, came to the conclusion that it is not ultimately tenable. Between the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s, Schmitt extensively revised his view of law and politics in light of legal institutionalism, a theory that considered law in general to be connected to the phenomenon of social organization and the legal order to be rooted in the laborious and enduring activity of social actors.The present article pursues three chief aims. First, we will provide grounds for holding that Schmitt's theory as a whole cannot be read through the lens of exceptionalism and decisionism. Secondly, we will explain the reasons why he decided to reconsider his approach. Thirdly, and more importantly, not only will our analysis aim to provide a better understanding of Schmitt's thinking, but it will also, and perhaps primarily, aim to shed some light on the limits of exceptionalism by tracing the tormented path followed by its inventor.In order to achieve these aims, we will first illustrate why the exceptionalist reading of Schmitt does not hold (Section 1). Then we will discuss the impact of institutionalism on Schmitt's overall theory (Section 2). We will go on by exploring Schmitt's particular version of institutionalism, as it reveals the chasm between a paradigm based on the exception and one that recognizes the foundational and vital role of social practices (Section 3). Finally, we will make the claim that Schmitt did away with exceptionalism precisely because of its abstract and paradoxical nature (Section 4).

La influencia de Maurice Hauriou en Carl Schmitt: del giro institucionalista al pensamiento del orden concreto

“…Al capitalizar la inclusión de estos dos elementos y la correspondiente exclusión de las connotaciones liberales de la teoría jurídica de Hauriou, Schmitt reúne el elemento subjetivo de lo social (creencias individuales compartidas por los sujetos sociales) y el elemento objetivo y suprapersonal de un orden creado por el Estado. 69 Como balance, Croce y Salvatore concluyen a este respecto que Schmitt "radicaliza la politización (y, a fortiori, la estatalización) del institucionalismo que (…) puede considerarse como el resultado final de la teoría de la institución de Hauriou, especialmente entre la primera (1910) y la segunda edición (1916) de sus Principes de droit public" 70 .…”

La Constitución material

“…Así, una comunidad política en particular existe solo en la medida en que su derecho público consiga conservar las condiciones necesarias para la protección de ciertas instituciones, tales como el matrimonio y la familia, las fuerzas armadas, la burocracia, el sistema monetario, etc. (Croce y Salvatore, 2013).…”

“…En esta etapa, el estado de excepción opera como una señal de que la constitución material y la relativa condensación de fuerzas políticas y sociales que la sustentan se encuentran bajo una seria amenaza de disolución y se requiere de una intervención extraordinaria. En otras palabras, la excepción no es un evento imprevisto que amenaza desde afuera a la normalidad del orden jurídico, sino que, por el contrario, la excepción emana desde adentro cuando la constitución material se ve amenazada (Croce y Salvatore, 2016).…”

The Material Constitution

“…In other words, the exception is not an unexpected event that threatens from outside the normality of the legal order; on the contrary, the exception surfaces from within, when the material constitution is under threat. 116 If the state of exception is considered legitimate when it aims at preserving the material constitution, 117 it makes little sense to consider it an extra-juridical moment beyond the knowledge of constitutional lawyers. The same logic unfolds in other cases where the core of the material constitution is at stake.…”