After Nuclear First Use, What?

Manzo, Vince; Warden, John K.

doi:10.1080/00396338.2018.1470770

Cited by 6 publications

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“…DPRK capabilities, combined with the unpredictability of the Kim regime, may also present decision-makers with a situation where nuclear weapons have already been used or US first-use may have counterforce justifications. Strategic planners writing about such scenarios have concluded that DPRK first-use would generate considerable pressure for nuclear retaliation from the US and allied publics and elites (Manzo and Warden 2018). By contrast, many conventional North Korean hostilities would be less likely to trigger these types of sentiments.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Under the Umbrella: Nuclear Crises, Extended Deterrence, and Public Opinion

Allison

Herzog

2022

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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How robust is public support for extended nuclear deterrence in patron and client states? Recent studies have improved scholarly understanding of US public opinion about nuclear weapon use against non-nuclear adversaries. Yet, there is limited knowledge of public attitudes regarding retaliation for nuclear strikes against US allies. We develop a theoretical typology of nuclear crises and investigate this phenomenon with a novel survey experiment ( n = 6,623). Americans, Japanese, and South Koreans viewed realistic emergency alert messages about a most-likely case for nuclear retaliation: a North Korean missile attack on a US ally protected by the nuclear umbrella. Support for nuclear retaliation is low in all three countries, with important cross-national differences. Favorability increases with North Korean nuclear first-use, but it remains limited nonetheless. Surprisingly, US “tripwire” troop casualties do not increase Americans’ demands for nuclear retaliation. These findings have important implications for the study of nuclear crises and practice of extended deterrence.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Under the Umbrella: Nuclear Crises, Extended Deterrence, and Public Opinion

Allison

Herzog

2022

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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Strategic non-nuclear weapons and the onset of a Third Nuclear Age

Futter

Zala

2021

Eur. j. of int. secur.

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Three decades after what is widely referred to as the transition from a First to a Second Nuclear Age, the world stands on the cusp of a possible Third Nuclear Age where the way that we conceptualise the central dynamics of the nuclear game will change again. This paradigm shift is being driven by the growth and spread of non-nuclear technologies with strategic applications and by a shift in thinking about the sources of nuclear threats and how they should be addressed, primarily, but not solely, in the United States. Recent scholarship has rightly identified a new set of challenges posed by the development of strategic non-nuclear weaponry (SNNW). But the full implications of this transformation in policy, technology and thinking for the global nuclear order as a whole have so far been underexplored. To remedy this, we look further ahead to the ways in which current trends, if taken to their logical conclusion, have the capacity to usher in a new nuclear era. We argue that in the years ahead, SNNW will increasingly shape the nuclear order, particularly in relation to questions of stability and risk. In the Third Nuclear Age, nuclear deployments, postures, balances, arms control, non-proliferation policy, and the prospects for disarmament, will all be shaped as much by developments in SNNW capabilities as by nuclear weapons. Consequently, we advocate for an urgent reassessment of the way nuclear order and nuclear risks are conceptualised as we confront the challenges of a Third Nuclear Age.

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Russian nuclear strategy and conventional inferiority

Bruusgaard

2020

Journal of Strategic Studies

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Contemporary debates on Russian nuclear strategy focus on making sense of Russia's nuclear capabilities, signalling and nuclear declarations. This paper argues that understanding how nuclear capabilities and strategy interact with conventional capabilities is fundamental to understanding nuclear strategy. It offers the Conventional Balance of Forces thesis for explaining change in Russia's nuclear strategy after the Cold War. It shows how Russian nuclear debates and strategy decisions have been affected by perceived conventional vulnerabilities, and how the orthodox Western interpretation of Russian nuclear strategy today as one of 'escalating to de-escalate' comes short of explaining when Russia would go nuclear in conflict, and why.

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After Nuclear First Use, What?

Cited by 6 publications

References 0 publications

Under the Umbrella: Nuclear Crises, Extended Deterrence, and Public Opinion

Under the Umbrella: Nuclear Crises, Extended Deterrence, and Public Opinion

Strategic non-nuclear weapons and the onset of a Third Nuclear Age

Russian nuclear strategy and conventional inferiority

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