After the pandemic: perspectives on the future trajectory of COVID-19

Telenti, Amalio; Arvin, Ann M.; Corey, Lawrence; Corti, Davide; Diamond, Michael S.; Garcı́a-Sastre, Adolfo; Garry, Robert F.; Holmes, Edward C.; Pang, Phillip S.; Virgin, Herbert W.

doi:10.1038/s41586-021-03792-w

Cited by 335 publications

(291 citation statements)

References 86 publications

(96 reference statements)

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“…Because of its increased ability to spread among human populations, “almost all current viruses are descended from it … evidence is accumulating that infected people not only spread the virus more efficiently, but also faster, allowing the variant to spread even more rapidly.” 73 (p846) With large numbers of people unvaccinated, the variants of the virus could become even more deadly immune to current vaccines. 75 , 76 …”

Section: Emergence Of Variants and Continued Politicizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Politicization and COVID-19 vaccine resistance in the U.S.

Bolsen

Palm

2022

Progress in Molecular Biology and Translational Science

147

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Section: Emergence Of Variants and Continued Politicizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Politicization and COVID-19 vaccine resistance in the U.S.

Bolsen

Palm

2022

Progress in Molecular Biology and Translational Science

147

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“…Experts anticipate that COVID-19 will move from a pandemic to an endemic disease, with epidemic wavelets diminishing over time. 72 Our analysis assumes that there will be ongoing costs from the vaccine programme. We have also looked at some of the direct costs of treating COVID-19 and long COVID patients.…”

Section: Ongoing Prevalence Of Covid-19mentioning

confidence: 99%

Health and social care funding projections 2021

Rocks¹,

Boccarini²,

Charlesworth³

et al. 2021

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This report presents the REAL Centre's projections of future health and social care funding requirements, both for the next 3 years and longer term funding to 2030/31. The projections are based on underlying funding pressures -such as population size and age structure -and additional funding pressures, such as potential policy choices. The report seeks to answer the question of how much funding the health and social care system may need over the next decade. This includes overall Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) budgets, day-to-day NHS funding and the funding made available to local authorities for adult social care.Although the report does not seek to recommend a course of action, it does set out the funding implications of choices about the speed of service recovery and staff pay. As such, scenarios and sensitivity analysis are presented to reflect considerable uncertainty, including in the external environment, particularly regarding COVID-19, and in the trade-offs and decisions government will need to make about its level of ambition for the pandemic recovery.The report presents two scenarios that reflect varying levels of ambition for the post-pandemic world -stabilisation and recovery. In the longer term to 2030/31, the scenarios require real-terms average annual increases in NHS funding of 3.1% and 3.5% respectively. In the short term, the stabilisation scenario would require additional NHS funding over and above that set out in the NHS Long Term Plan. This equates to an additional £4.7bn in 2021/22, £4.0bn in 2022/23 and £2.9bn in 2023/24. The scenarios include funding to enable a modest expansion in the availability of adult social care services, support provider sustainability and pay social care workers more. To achieve these aims funding for adult social care would need to rise more quickly than for the NHS. * See chapter 5 for a full breakdown of scenario assumptions. * Absolute values after 2018/19 include NHS pensions adjustment of £2.85bn in nominal terms; growth rates exclude this pension adjustment. Note, our DHSC RDEL estimate excludes the costs of running an ongoing test and trace system. Health and social care funding projections 2021 8 Table 3: Average annual increase in funding for social care, projected and historical Government Years Average annual increase for social care Coalition government 2009/10-2014/15 -2.0% Cameron and May governments 2014/15-2018/19 1.8% Johnson Conservative government 2018/19-2020/21 1.7% Scenarios 2019/20-2030/31* Projected growth rates Stabilisation Recovery 4.3% 5.8% Source: REAL Centre calculations. *For social care modelling, the baseline year is 2019/20.COVID-19's economic legacy has an impact on the share of national wealth that would be spent on health and social care in response to rising funding pressures. Under both scenarios, the share of national income required to meet the funding needs for the UK would be in the range of 10% by 2030/31. This is an increase of more than 2 percentage points against the 2018/19 baseline. This is similar to...

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“…With the observation on increasing cases with vaccine breakthrough, the rapid emergence of VOCs with a wide spectrum of immunogenicity, high transmissibility, and resistance to the antibody caused by natural infection or vaccination, and the waning immunity among the population, there is a high likelihood for the establishment of SARS-CoV-2 in population. 36 Given the possibility of this long-term association of SARS-CoV-2 with human population, the goal of epidemic surveillance may shift from the elimination of this pathogen to the balance between healthcare capacity, socioeconomical activity, and population immunity. If it is such a case, the proposed surveillance models should take this factor into account and then can be used as a guide to inform the containment measures required to mitigate large scale CAO bounded by the healthcare capacity.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epidemic Surveillance Models for Containing the Spread of SARS-CoV-2 Variants: Taiwan Experience

Yen

Chen

Chang

et al. 2021

Preprint

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Objectives: Two kinds of epidemic surveillance models are presented for containing the spread of SARS-CoV-2 variants so as to avert and stamp out a community-acquired outbreak (CAO) with non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs), tests, and vaccination. Design: The surveillance of domestic cluster infections transmitted from imported cases with one-week time lag assessed by the Poisson model and the surveillance of whether, how and when NPIs and test contained the CAO with the SEIR model. Settings: Border and Community of Taiwan. Main Outcome Measurements: The expected number and the upper bound of the 95% credible interval (CrI) of weekly covid-19 cases compared with the observed number for assessing the threshold of a CAO; effective reproductive number (Rt) and the effectiveness of NPIs for containing a CAO. Results: For the period of January-September 2020 when the wild type and the D614G period were prevailing, an increase in one imported case prior to one week would lead to 9.54% (95% CrI 6.44% to 12.59%) higher risk of domestic cluster infection that provides a one-week prior alert signal for more stringent NPIs and active testing locally. Accordingly, there was an absence of CAO until the Alpha VOC period of February 2021. However, given level one of NPI alert the risk of domestic cluster infections was gradually elevated to 14.14% (95% CrI 5.41% to 25.10%), leading to the Alpha VOC CAOs of six hotspots around mid-May 2021. It took two-and-half months for containing this CAO mainly with level three of NPI alert and rapid test and partially by the rolling out of vaccination. By applying the SEIR model, the Rt decreased from 4.0 at beginning to 0.7 on 31 July 2021 in parallel with the escalating NPIs from 30% to 90%. Containing a small outbreak of Delta VOC during this CAO period was also evaluated and demonstrated. After controlling the CAO, it again returned to imported-domestic transmission for Delta VOC from July until September 2021, giving an estimate of 10.16% (95% CrI: 7.01% to 13.59%) for the risk of several small cluster infections. However, there was an absence of CAO that resulted from the effectiveness of NPIs and tests, and the rapid expansion of vaccination. Conclusions: Averting and containing CAOs of SARS-CoV-2 variants are demonstrated by two kinds of epidemic surveillance models that have been applied to Taiwan scenario. These two models can be accommodated to monitor the epidemic of forthcoming emerging SARS-CoV-2 VOCs with various circumstances of vaccine coverage, NPIs, and tests in countries worldwide.

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After the pandemic: perspectives on the future trajectory of COVID-19

Cited by 335 publications

References 86 publications

Politicization and COVID-19 vaccine resistance in the U.S.

Politicization and COVID-19 vaccine resistance in the U.S.

Health and social care funding projections 2021

Epidemic Surveillance Models for Containing the Spread of SARS-CoV-2 Variants: Taiwan Experience

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