After “the Regulatory Moment” in Comparative Regulatory Studies: Modeling the Early Stages of Regulatory Life Cycles

Abstract

Regulation has been the subject of a significant amount of scholarship, mostly debating the necessity of regulatory action or examining the phenomenon of capture. Less attention has been paid to the early stages of regulatory development, during which the structure of the regime is defined. By revisiting the life-cycle analogy of regulation first proposed by Bernstein in 1955, we offer a new model that explains the development of these early stages in greater depth. This model is then applied to case studies of several sectors in the US and UK to highlight the general pattern of early regulatory regime development.

Fearing Food: The Influence of Risk Perceptions on Public Preferences for Uniform and Centralized Risk Regulation

“…Regulations to manage risk in society arise, at least in part, because the public demands government protection from anxiety‐provoking hazards (e.g. Breyer, ; Howlett & Newman, ; Lodge, ; Newman & Howlett, ; Wildavsky, ). Public perceptions of risk vary by policy domain, but it is common for perceptions in all domains to change in response to exogenous events or crises; technological advances; and, importantly, elite framing (Albertson & Gadarian, ; Merolla & Zechmeister, ; Slovic, ; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, ; Wildavsky & Dake, ).…”

Designing effective water policy: capacity and effectiveness of reforms in developing countries

“…The dynamic nature of capacity stands out in the Manila case where the hybrid agency-contract system has evolved over time and the agency has gained technical operational and political capacities. The RO in Manila seems to fit the archetype of 'vigorous youth' (Howlett & Newman, 2013) while SPAN may still be its infancy. SPAN may be able to look forward to increasing effectiveness as the implementation of other aspects of the policy package proceed.…”

“…A second dynamic phenomenon is that even well designed regulators may drift from their intended functions over time, as a result of regulatory capture, political capture or interference, or bureaucratic self-interest. The regulator may over time become more susceptible to capture by the regulated entities (Bernstein, 1955;Howlett & Newman, 2013). Unfortunately, government interference and industry capture are not alternative problems.…”

The Role of Uncertainty in Regulating E‐Cigarettes: The Emergence of a Regulatory Regime, 2005‐15

“…Several studies have previously suggested that when the availability of information is low (and uncertainty is therefore high), governments are reluctant to impose regulatory action (Howlett and Migone ; Leiss ; Otway and Ravetz ). Howlett and Newman () argue that regulation occurs through an evolutionary process, in which accumulated information and the perception of crises push regulatory efforts through successive stages of development. According to this model, information is critical in supporting regulation, especially at early stages in the development of a regulatory regime.…”

“…According to this model, information is critical in supporting regulation, especially at early stages in the development of a regulatory regime. When faced with uncertainty, governments tend to delay action as long as possible, will minimize the severity of the issue instead of exploring options for intervention, will frequently encourage voluntary self‐regulation, and as a last resort, will sometimes attempt to adapt existing legislation or existing regulatory rules (Howlett and Newman , 111; Nekola and Moravek ). Information is seen by these authors as a primary contributing force in the evolution of regulatory regimes.…”