Again, What the Philosophy of Biology is not

Callebaut, Werner

doi:10.1007/s10441-005-5352-7

Cited by 24 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 72 publications

(43 reference statements)

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“…Philosophy of Biology, since its origins as a discipline during the 1970s, has been characterized for having a positivistic flavour. Thus, epistemological and methodological approaches to conceptual biological problems prevailed over metaphysical ones (Callebaut 2005). During the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century, the situation changed.…”

Section: Metaphysics Of Biologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Exploring the Interactions between Metaphysics and Science

Triviño

2023

Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy

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The debate in Metaphysics of Science concerning the interaction between metaphysics and science has been mainly approached from the perspective of the scientificdiscipline of physics. In this paper, I address this debate from a different framework, namely that of biology. I pay attention to the recent characterization of Metaphysics of Biology and the different forms in which philosophers use metaphysics when addressing conceptual biological problems. In doing so, I argue that two main lessons can be obtained that can serve to enrich the debate in Metaphysics of Science: i) that the interaction between metaphysics and science seems to be more complex than generally considered; and ii) that the type of metaphysics that is interacting with science when characterizing the ontological status of the world is neither the a priori nor the naturalized one, but a different form of metaphysics that will be labelled here as applied metaphysics.

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Section: Metaphysics Of Biologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Exploring the Interactions between Metaphysics and Science

Triviño

2023

Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy

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“…So far I have discussed some of what I think are the major scientific aspects of an ES. The ES, however, also presents philosophically interesting features, which, in turn, have consequences for the way scientists look at their own disciplines (Callebaut 2005; Love 2008; Pigliucci 2008b). To begin with, for instance, we should be under no misunderstanding that the proposed move from the MS to the ES represents a paradigm shift (Kuhn 1970) in evolutionary biology.…”

Section: From Science To Philosophy and Backmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Extended Synthesis for Evolutionary Biology

Pigliucci

2009

Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences

171

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Evolutionary theory is undergoing an intense period of discussion and reevaluation. This, contrary to the misleading claims of creationists and other pseudoscientists, is no harbinger of a crisis but rather the opposite: the field is expanding dramatically in terms of both empirical discoveries and new ideas. In this essay I briefly trace the conceptual history of evolutionary theory from Darwinism to neo-Darwinism, and from the Modern Synthesis to what I refer to as the Extended Synthesis, a more inclusive conceptual framework containing among others evo-devo, an expanded theory of heredity, elements of complexity theory, ideas about evolvability, and a reevaluation of levels of selection. I argue that evolutionary biology has never seen a paradigm shift, in the philosophical sense of the term, except when it moved from natural theology to empirical science in the middle of the 19th century. The Extended Synthesis, accordingly, is an expansion of the Modern Synthesis of the 1930s and 1940s, and one that-like its predecessor-will probably take decades to complete.

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“…In this article, we wish to show that the naturalistic viewpoint proposed by Werner Callebaut in ''Again, what philosophy of biology is not'' (Callebaut 2005) witnesses of the tensions and contradictions that we consider as typical of a philosophy in which the definitional questions we just sketched tend to be minimized or silenced. The choice for a naturalistic viewpoint in philosophy of biology is motivated by the concern of ''disturbing'' as minimally as possible research in biology.…”

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confidence: 96%

Philosophy of Biology: Naturalistic or Transcendental?

Kolen

Vijver

2007

Acta Biotheor

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The aim of this article is to clarify the meaning of a naturalistic position within philosophy of biology, against the background of an alternative view, founded on the basic insights of transcendental philosophy. It is argued that the apparently minimal and neutral constraints naturalism imposes on philosophy of science turn out to involve a quite heavily constraining metaphysics, due to the naturalism's fundamental neglect of its own perspective. Because of its intrinsic sensitivity to perspectivity and historicity, transcendental philosophy can avoid this type of hidden metaphysics.

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Again, What the Philosophy of Biology is not

Cited by 24 publications

References 72 publications

Exploring the Interactions between Metaphysics and Science

Exploring the Interactions between Metaphysics and Science

An Extended Synthesis for Evolutionary Biology

Philosophy of Biology: Naturalistic or Transcendental?

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