Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity

Abstract

Divine Simplicity has it that God is absolutely simple. God exhibits no metaphysical complexity; he has neither proper parts nor distinct intrinsic properties. Recently, Jeffrey Brower has put forward an account of divine simplicity that has it that God is the truthmaker for all intrinsic essential predications about him. This allows Brower to preserve the intuitive thought that God is not a property but a concrete being. In this paper, I provide two objections to Brower's account that are meant to show that whatever merits this account of divine simplicity has, plausibility is not one of them.Divine simplicity has it that God is absolutely simple. God exhibits no metaphysical complexity; he has neither proper parts nor distinct intrinsic properties. Now modern discussions of divine simplicity have tended to focus exclusively on a version of divine simplicity that makes God identical to a property.1 But, as has been stressed before, saying that God is a property is highly implausible. 2 Jeffrey Brower, a proponent of divine simplicity, agrees when he says the strategy they adopt [the strategy of making God identical to a property] for making sense of simplicity appears not only extreme, but also extremely ad hoc.Indeed, it would seem that any account of simplicity that could render the doctrine coherent without giving up the traditional conception of properties would be preferable to them.

Truthmaking, resemblance, and divine simplicity

“…See Oppy (2003), 5-6; Bergman and Bower (2006), 380-384;Brower (2008), 17-18;Pruss (2008), 153;and Brower (2009), 111-113. 12. For other criticisms of the truthmaker interpretation, see, e.g., Schmitt (2013), Saenz (2014), andHasker (2016). 13.…”

“…12.For other criticisms of the truthmaker interpretation, see, e.g., Schmitt (2013), Saenz (2014), and Hasker (2016). …”