Are minds really dynamical or are they really symbolic? Because minds are bundles of computations, and because computation is always a matter of interpretation of one system by another, minds are necessarily symbolic. Because minds, along with everything else in the universe, are physical, and insofar as the laws of physics are dynamical, minds are necessarily dynamical systems. Thus, the short answer to the opening question is "yes." It makes sense to ask further whether some of the computations that constitute a human mind are constrained by functional, algorithmic, or implementational factors to be essentially of the discrete symbolic variety (even if they supervene on an apparently continuous dynamical substrate). I suggest that here too the answer is "yes" and discuss the need for such discrete, symbolic cognitive computations in communication-related tasks.
On the nature of cognitionMinds are fundamentally computational phenomena (Turing, 1950;McCulloch, 1965;Marr, 1982;Minsky, 1985;Dennett, 1991;Metzinger, 2003;McDermott, 2001;Nilsson, 2006;Minsky, 2006). The distinguishing and still surprisingly widely underappreciated feature of the explanatory framework for cognition that rests on this insight is that it has no viable alternatives (Edelman, 2008).Consider the so-called lightness problem, which is typical of visual perception: light from a source whose intensity is not directly known to the perceiver falls onto a surface whose reflectance needs to be estimated. The only course of action available to the perceiver is to try and estimate both the intensity and the reflectance from the amount of light that enters the measurement device (an eye or a camera). The pertinent observation here is that the essence of the process of distinguishing dark from light surfaces under potentially variable illumination -no matter how that process is instantiated -is a computation. Specifically, it consists of the factorization of the number that represents the measured light quantity, whereby the source intensity and the surface reflectance that are multiplicatively confounded in the measurement are recovered (Edelman, 2008, p.8). 1 All other perceptual tasks can be given similarly explicit computational formulations. * Invited target article for the special issue of JETAI on Pluralism and the Future of Cognitive Science.1 How two unknowns can be recovered from a single measurement is an interesting question (Marr, 1982;Edelman, 2008) that is beside the point for the present discussion.1 Just as perception is inherently computational, so is action. As an example, consider the nature of the problem that is solved by a cat that jumps onto a table (Edelman, 2008, p.428). This problem consists of estimating the right amount of momentum that the cat must impart to itself -a momentum that would allow it to clear the table's near edge, yet would not send it sailing over the table to hit the wall on the far side. The cat's safe landing on the table indicates that its brain has successfully carried out a series of arithme...