Against the reduction of modality to essence

Wildman, Nathan

doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1667-6

Cited by 21 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 63 publications

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“…is not apt for explanation-i.e., if a statement of the form (F) Romero (2019), Teitel (2019) and Wildman (2018) also express doubts about explaining modality in terms of essence. 13 A purely general predicate is one that does not contain any singular terms.…”

Section: The Existence Of Naturesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Essence and Explanation

Casullo

2020

Metaphysics

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In Necessary Beings, Bob Hale addresses two questions: What is the source of necessity? What is the source of our knowledge of it? He offers novel responses to them in terms of the metaphysical notion of nature or, more familiarly, essence. In this paper, I address Hale's response to the first question. My assessment is negative. I argue that his essentialist explanation of the source of necessity suffers from three significant shortcomings. First, Hale's leading example of an essentialist explanation merely asserts that the nature of an entity explains some necessity, but leaves unexplained how it does so. Second, his essentialist explanation of particular necessities introduces new necessities that remain unexplained. Third, Hale's version of essentialism presupposes a controversial metaphysical theory of properties, for which he offers no defense.

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Section: The Existence Of Naturesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Essence and Explanation

Casullo

2020

Metaphysics

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“…Next he gives an account of the Finean theory that facts about metaphysical modality are grounded in facts about essence, clarifying the modifications he wishes to make. He defends the theory from a criticism by Wildman (2018), but his main argument for it is an argument for the conceptual truth of E-N, considered below. The rest of the paper is devoted to the exposition and defence of the essentialist theory of our epistemic access to modality outlined in our Introduction.…”

Section: Jago's Papermentioning

confidence: 99%

From Essence to Metaphysical Modality?

Noonan

2020

Axiomathes

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How can we acquire knowledge of metaphysical modality? How can someone come to know that he could have been elsewhere right now, or an accountant rather than a philosophy teacher, but could not have been a turnip? Jago proposes an account of a route to knowledge of the way things could have been and must be. He argues that we can move to knowledge of metaphysical modality from knowledge about essence. Curtis rejects Jago’s explanation. It cannot, he argues, explain our knowledge of de re necessity. We agree. But there is more to be said. To give an account of our knowledge of metaphysical necessity is part of the task Jago set himself. But another part is to give an account of the knowledge of the (non-actual) possibilities accorded to particular objects. And prior to both what is needed, and something Jago attempts to supply, is an account of how ordinary knowers can come to have knowledge of an individual’s essential properties. We argue that Jago’s accounts of both these additional matters are also unsatisfactory. This is important because the thought that our knowledge of metaphysical modality has its source in our knowledge of essence is currently an attractive one and Jago has set out very clearly what must be done to justify the thought. The flaws in his proposal thus indicate the work needed if the attractive thought is to be accepted.

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“…I'm going to ignore these complications here. Wildman (2018) objects to the inference from essence to necessity, on the grounds that there are possible entities with contradictory essences. He considers tossing a coin, with incompatible outcomes heads and tails.…”

Section: Modal Reduction To Essencementioning

confidence: 99%

Knowing how things might have been

Jago

2018

Synthese

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I know that I could have been where you are right now and that you could have been where I am right now, but that neither of us could have been turnips or natural numbers. This knowledge of metaphysical modality stands in need of explanation. I will offer an account based on our knowledge of the natures, or essencess, of things. I will argue that essences need not be viewed as metaphysically bizarre entities; that we can conceptualise and refer to essences; and that we can gain knowledge of them. We can know about which properties are, and which properties are not, essential to a given entity. This knowledge of essence offers a route to knowledge of the ways those entities must be or could be.

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Against the reduction of modality to essence

Cited by 21 publications

References 63 publications

Essence and Explanation

Essence and Explanation

From Essence to Metaphysical Modality?

Knowing how things might have been

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