2011
DOI: 10.4102/sajbm.v42i3.496
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Agency costs, corporate governance mechanisms and performance of public listed family firms in Malaysia

Abstract: We compare corporate governance and performance between family and non-family ownership of public listed companies in Malaysia from 1999 through 2005 measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA. We also examine the governance mechanisms as a tool in monitoring agency costs based on asset utilization ratio and expense ratio as proxy for agency costs. We find that on average firm value is lower in family firms than non-family firms, while board size, independent director and duality have a significant impact on firm performan… Show more

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Cited by 44 publications
(22 citation statements)
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“…While political connections exploited via interlocking directorships in non‐family firms (Ibrahim and Samad ) may decline over time, family firms ensure that this ‘specialized asset’ (Bennedsen et al . ) is properly transferred through generations or build new political connections by sending their children into politics (Bertrand and Schoar ).…”
Section: Political Connections As a Governance Mechanismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While political connections exploited via interlocking directorships in non‐family firms (Ibrahim and Samad ) may decline over time, family firms ensure that this ‘specialized asset’ (Bennedsen et al . ) is properly transferred through generations or build new political connections by sending their children into politics (Bertrand and Schoar ).…”
Section: Political Connections As a Governance Mechanismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This result might indicate that larger board size increases the independence of the board and reduces the problem of managerial entrenchment (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Yermack (1996) and Ibrahim and Samad (2008) found that performance is negatively and significantly related to board size. This result indicates that it is easier to monitor managers with a small board and a small board leads to better decision-making.…”
Section: Board Sizementioning
confidence: 95%
“…Gill and Obradovich (2012) found that larger board size negatively affects the value of American firms. Other stream of studies that found negative relationship between board size and firm performance include (Ali and Nasir, 2014;Ibrahim and Abdul Samed, 2011) among others. However, Yasser, Entebang and Abu Mansor, 2011) found a significant positive relationship between board size and performance measured by return on equity (ROE).…”
Section: Board Size and Financial Performancementioning
confidence: 99%