Agency-level Perceptions of Monetary Sanctions: Current Landscape and Impediments to Reform

Abstract

Due to increasing recognition of the collateral consequences associated with monetary sanctions, fees have begun to occupy a prominent place in critical debates. This is especially true for community corrections, where multiple fees are assessed and collected. However, the agency-level perspective has largely been omitted, especially regarding how the current landscape may facilitate—or impede—reform. Using self-report data from a state-wide sample of Chiefs of Probation and Parole, this paper provides a new perspective on the complex interplay between the policy and practices surrounding monetary sanctions. Responses suggest that the practices and philosophies surrounding the collection of fees vary significantly between jurisdictions. This obligation is also reported to challenge the traditional roles of probation officers by limiting discretion and complicating the existing tensions between their treatment and control-oriented responsibilities. Some respondents indicated meaningful reliance on fee revenue for operational and treatment budgets. Implications for policy reform, especially considering the variation observed in this single state, are discussed.

Legal financial obligations in the United States: A review of recent research

“…A larger portion of police and court staff time is devoted to administering LFOs, and then issuing warrants and making arrests for nonpayment, increasing peoples' contact with law enforcement (Brett, 2020; Martin et al., 2018; U.S. Department of Justice, 2015). Recent work shows how this change in behavior is not contained to police and courts given that LFOs are assessed and enforced during incarceration and community supervision (Hyatt et al., 2020), and many community supervision agencies rely heavily on revenue generated from supervisees' fees to maintain their services (King et al., 2022). Ebony Ruhland's work (Ruhland, 2020; Ruhland et al., 2020) builds on previous research on LFOs collection and probation outcomes (Gordon & Glaser, 1991; Morgan, 1995; Olson & Ramker, 2001; Peterson, 2012; Wheeler et al., 1989) by studying probation officers and managers themselves and their relationship to LFO collection.…”

Who Pays? Measuring Differences in the Process of Repayment of Legal Financial Obligations

“…Shifting to collection, localized reliance on fee and cost revenue can influence system functioning and decision making around collections (Atkinson 2016;Graham and Makowsky 2021;Sobol 2016). Varied prioritization of this revenue stream ostensibly generates differentially aggressive collection and enforcement contexts and differential understanding of this responsibility within other agency responsibilities (Hyatt et al 2020). The specific method of collection seems to matter for repayment, as there may be more unpaid debt in jurisdictions that rely on specialized units within probation departments to collect LFOs ).…”

“…Probation and parole agencies can impose and collect internallyassessed costs and fees associated with the use of supervision conditions, such as monthly supervision fees or electronic monitoring device operation fees. In some jurisdictions, these agencies are also responsible for the downstream collection of externally-assessed fines, costs, and restitution imposed by the courts and other preceding agencies (e.g., Ruhland 2020; Hyatt et al 2020).…”

Reframing the debate on legal financial obligations and crime: How accruing monetary sanctions impacts recidivism

“…Administrative data on LFOs are often fragmented and captures little of the complex process of repayment (Link et al., 2021). These challenges have led to the development of a body of scholarship centering on describing some of the common sources of potential financial obligations (Bannon et al., 2010; Pleggenkuhle, 2018; Ruhland et al., 2020; Ward & Link, 2022), qualitatively oriented studies about how LFOs negatively impact the lives of those who experience them (Harris, 2016; Harris et al., 2010; Ortiz & Jackey, 2019; Pleggenkuhle, 2018; Pogrebin et al., 2014), and inquiries into the legal and procedural issues surrounding their application and collection (Colgan, 2018; Garrett, 2022; Hyatt et al., 2020; Logan & Wright, 2014; Lollar, 2022; Ruback, 2015). Although considering the long‐term impact of these debts is often beyond the scope of these inquiries, with limitations imposed by the opaque LFO context, issues with data, and other practical hurdles, this work has moved the literature on justice debt forward in a short period.…”

“…Despite the growing body of evidence regarding the negative impacts on people, a countervailing justification exists that encourages the proliferation and persistence of LFO policies. LFOs are often sources of revenue for criminal justice and other governmental institutions (Hyatt et al., 2020; Martin, 2018). This revenue can offset the costs of operating a justice system that otherwise would be shifted to the taxpayer, allowing for supervision and treatment activities that may not otherwise occur (Ruhland, 2021).…”