Agenda Control by Committee Chairs in Fragmented Multi-party Parliaments

Rosenthal, Maoz

doi:10.3167/isr.2018.330105

Cited by 5 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 48 publications

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“…In most parliaments, committee chairs have influence over the committee agenda, are part of the legislature's coordinating bodies, receive substantial media attention (Chiru 2020; Chiru and Gherghina 2019; Fernandes et al 2019; Gattermann and Vasilopoulou 2015; Rosenthal 2018) and are thought to play a key role in attempts to correct ministerial drift (Carroll and Cox 2012; Fortunato et al 2019). Nevertheless, some recent work has cast doubt over the shadowing argument regarding committee chairs.…”

Section: Committee Chair Shadowing: Previous Evidence and New Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Allocation of Committee Chairs and the Oversight of Coalition Cabinets in Belgium

Chiru

Winter

2021

Gov. & oppos.

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The appointment of committee chairs to monitor the actions of ministers belonging to coalition partners has received considerably less attention than other mechanisms of policing the coalition agreement at executive or legislative level. We take a longitudinal perspective focusing on 11 Belgian cabinets (1980–2018) to study the determinants of such appointments and whether there is a substitution effect between shadow chairs, junior ministers and coalition agreements. Our findings indicate that the probability of appointing a shadow committee chair is higher when the ideological distance between the minister's party and the coalition is larger. Other key findings are that ministers facing hostile junior ministers tend to be shadowed by committee chairs as well, while shadow chairs are also more frequent in minimum winning coalitions.

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Section: Committee Chair Shadowing: Previous Evidence and New Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Allocation of Committee Chairs and the Oversight of Coalition Cabinets in Belgium

Chiru

Winter

2021

Gov. & oppos.

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“…In both the time devoted to private legislation is limited. Therefore, the tactical use of time in the bargaining process and the power of political actors in agenda setting are crucial (Brä uninger et al 2017;Rosenthal 2018). Hence, the part of the legislative process that involves floor and committee debates and voting is challenging, because individual legislators need to convince other legislators including the committee chairs of the relevant committee to vote in favor of the bill.…”

Section: Hearings On the Floor And In Committeementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hence, the part of the legislative process that involves floor and committee debates and voting is challenging, because individual legislators need to convince other legislators including the committee chairs of the relevant committee to vote in favor of the bill. It is a never-ending negotiation process and depends on the legislators' ability to create ad-hoc coalitions (Rosenthal 2018).…”

Section: Hearings On the Floor And In Committeementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Scholars agree that committees are critical parts of the organization of most legislatures. Therefore, it is important to understand the way they work and influence parliamentary behavior (Halligan and Reid 2016;Rosenthal 2018). For example, Halligan and Reid (2016) found that the conditions of the hung parliament in Australia between 2010 and 2013 significantly increased the level of dissent in the committees of the House of Representatives.…”

Section: Hearings On the Floor And In Committeementioning

confidence: 99%

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The Frequency of Use of Legislative and Non-Legislative Tools in Five Countries

Akirav¹

2021

RES

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This study analyzes the use of legislative and non-legislative tools, which has rarely been done simultaneously. I collected data about the frequency of use of legislative tools (presenting and passing legislation) and non-legislative tools (making one-minute speeches, written and oral parliamentary questions and motions for the agenda) in five countries: the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and Israel. The results confirm my three hypotheses. Legislators from Australia, the UK and Canada use fewer legislative tools because their use is more constrained than in the US and Israel. Legislators use more semi or unconstrained tools that involve publicity than those that simply appear on the record. Finally, opposition members use more non-legislative tools while government members use more legislative tools. However, the degree of constraint on the use of the tool moderates this finding. The study provides a comprehensive understanding of the legislators' strategic use of legislative and non-legislative tools. 

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“…Legislative committees comprise a major component in the policy process within the Knesset. These Knesset committees have a significant degree of impact both in their legislative and oversight roles (Friedberg and Hazan 2009;Friedberg 2011;Rosenthal 2018). A combination of factors makes the committees appealing policy arenas and creates opportunity structures for interventions into the policy process.…”

Section: Opportunity Structures and Social Worker Policy Engagement In Israelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social Workers and the Policy Process: When Does Opportunity Knock?

Gal

Weiss‐Gal

2020

J of Pol Practice & Research

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Social workers' policy engagement has been the subject of growing interest in the social work discourse in recent years. In order to contribute to theoretical and empirical knowledge for social workers and social work organizations seeking to undertake their policy role, this article will seek to better understand one of the types of factors that determines this engagement, particularly on the macro level. The focus of much of the discussion on the factors associated with social workers' policy engagement has been on social workers' motivation to engage in policy practice and the degree to which their workplaces facilitate this type of activity. However, the discourse tends to ignore the impact of the policy environment on this. Drawing on the concept of "opportunity structures" and insights from the neo-institutionalist literature, this article suggests that social workers' access to the policy-making process is crucial if we seek to better understand their policy practice. On the basis of examples from different countries and historical periods, and a more in-depth examination of Israeli case studies, we underscore the ways in which opportunity structures deriving from institutional or temporal factors lead to divergences in the form and level that policy engagement by social workers takes in different contexts.

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Agenda Control by Committee Chairs in Fragmented Multi-party Parliaments

Cited by 5 publications

References 48 publications

The Allocation of Committee Chairs and the Oversight of Coalition Cabinets in Belgium

The Allocation of Committee Chairs and the Oversight of Coalition Cabinets in Belgium

The Frequency of Use of Legislative and Non-Legislative Tools in Five Countries

Social Workers and the Policy Process: When Does Opportunity Knock?

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