2012
DOI: 10.1108/03684921211276765
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Agent behaviors and coordinative mechanism

Abstract: Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to improve the behaviors coordination mechanism, to maintain the system's long time-scale and stable competitive capability, when the agents in the system focus on cooperating with each other. Design/methodology/approach -Effort level for every agent, whose dynamics can be described as a stochastic partial differential equation, and the incentive of effort as the control of the corresponding agent, are introduced to describe agents' behavior abstracted. The cooperative sto… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
3
0

Year Published

2021
2021
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
4

Relationship

2
2

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 4 publications
(3 citation statements)
references
References 22 publications
0
3
0
Order By: Relevance
“…The specification meaning should be seen in Remark 1 and Remark 2 in Supplementary Material. An example is given to specify this process in Zheng et al [16], to explain the agent's coordination strategy and effort level in the stochastic cooperative differential game framework. In fact, the rational payoff distributed and the corresponding compensatory is independent of the discount function; the distinction is in detail in the imputation process.…”
Section: Dynamical Shapley Value For Distribution Coalition's Payoffmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The specification meaning should be seen in Remark 1 and Remark 2 in Supplementary Material. An example is given to specify this process in Zheng et al [16], to explain the agent's coordination strategy and effort level in the stochastic cooperative differential game framework. In fact, the rational payoff distributed and the corresponding compensatory is independent of the discount function; the distinction is in detail in the imputation process.…”
Section: Dynamical Shapley Value For Distribution Coalition's Payoffmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Zheng et al [28] proved that the necessary and sufficient condition for the complex system structure to remain stable is that all agents are familiar with the strategies of other agents in the subsystem, the income is maximised, and the optimal income converges to a certain interval. Moreover, Zheng [29] proved that when time-scale switching occurs, the topology of the agent will change.…”
Section: Construction Of Individual Behaviour Model Of E-commerce Cre...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In this sense, this problem is degenerated to a multi-player game whatever cooperation game or non-cooperation game is considered or both of them are considered. So, there always exists an equilibrium solution and an optimal strategy [30] .…”
Section: Several Perhaps Important Conjecturesmentioning
confidence: 99%