2021
DOI: 10.1111/1475-679x.12350
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Aggressive Boards and CEO Turnover

Abstract: This study investigates a communication game between a CEO and a board of directors where the CEO's career concerns can potentially impede value‐increasing informative communication. By adopting a policy of aggressive boards (excessive replacement), shareholders can facilitate communication between the CEO and the board. The results are in contrast to the multitude of models which generally find that management‐friendly boards improve communication, and help to explain empirical results concerning CEO turnover… Show more

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Cited by 15 publications
(6 citation statements)
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References 78 publications
(163 reference statements)
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“…An overconfident CEO also has low forced turnover risk when he/she has strong capability. We compare with recent studies and find that they seldom focus on the topic of overconfident CEO such as Aghamolla and Hashimoto (2021), who mention that CEO’s turnover risk is low when a CEO has various talents. Other literature talks about CEO’s forced turnover, shareholders, and control contests (Zhong et al, 2021), the Securities and Exchange Commission’s enforcement actions and the probability of a CEO’s turnover, (Chang et al, 2021); institutional trading, information production, and forced CEO turnover (Chemmanur et al, 2021), the turnover probability for a CEO in a heavily polluting industry (Gu et al, 2021), and a corporation’s return and information signal of a CEO’s turnover to the market (Farah & Li, 2021).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 87%
“…An overconfident CEO also has low forced turnover risk when he/she has strong capability. We compare with recent studies and find that they seldom focus on the topic of overconfident CEO such as Aghamolla and Hashimoto (2021), who mention that CEO’s turnover risk is low when a CEO has various talents. Other literature talks about CEO’s forced turnover, shareholders, and control contests (Zhong et al, 2021), the Securities and Exchange Commission’s enforcement actions and the probability of a CEO’s turnover, (Chang et al, 2021); institutional trading, information production, and forced CEO turnover (Chemmanur et al, 2021), the turnover probability for a CEO in a heavily polluting industry (Gu et al, 2021), and a corporation’s return and information signal of a CEO’s turnover to the market (Farah & Li, 2021).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 87%
“…For example, Fredrickson, Hambrick, and Baumrin (1988) contend that CEOs are more likely to be dismissed in industries in which there is a larger number of firms, as the number of firms signifies the volume of the executive pool from which firms can hire. Empirically, firms are more aggressive in replacing CEOs when the variance in CEO talent is low, suggesting a number of viable replacements (Aghamolla & Hashimoto, 2021). The presence of potential replacement candidates on the board of directors also may lead to an increase in the likelihood of executive turnover, especially for CEOs (Mobbs, 2013).…”
Section: An Elm Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Subsequently, scholars have extensively analyzed the impact of CEO/board of directors' characteristics on firm performance. Various papers tried to study different elements, such as demographic background (Lohrke, Bedeian & Palmer, 2004), top management team replacement (Sudarsanam & Lai, 2001;Aghamolla & Hashimoto, 2021), CEO characteristics (Abebe & Tangpong, 2009;Miglani, 2014;Susi & Lukason, 2017) and insider representation on board (Judge & Zeithmal, 1992). However, existing empirical evidence is generally ambiguous and mixed (Scafarto et al, 2017;Minichilli, Zattoni, & Zona, 2009).…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%