An anthropology of moralities would do well to move beyond traditional moral concepts in the realization that most moral lives and ethical projects-what we might call moral experience-are lived according to an entirely other set of moral concepts that are concerned with dwelling in the world, that is, with expanding, maintaining, repairing, or even disentangling from constitutive relationships. In this article I suggest attunement and fidelity as ontological conditions for this moral way of being-in-the-world. I argue that in limiting our disciplinary focus to traditional moral philosophies and concepts we do more to reproduce a particular moral philosophic tradition than to understand moral experience in the world. Although today many institutional and public discourses of morality emphasize the good and the right, I argue that an ontology of assembled and relational-being reveals that morality and ethics go well beyond good and evil. [morality, ethics, ontology, assemblage] In this article I argue that an anthropological study of morality and ethics is best served by going beyond the moral theories of philosophers, the concepts they have passed on to us, and the ontology these theories and concepts assume.1 I begin by pointing out that although there has been a growing disciplinary interest in the explicit study of moralities and ethics, there remains a reliance on philosophical frameworks for doing so and particularly those of the neo-Aristotelian and Foucauldian bent. I argue that such a reliance restricts our research and analysis because it limits what we might recognize as moral experience beforehand, and thus to counter such limitation, we are best served with a broad and open framework that allows us to discern the diverse and oftentimes wide-ranging moral claims, acts, and dispositions we may find in the world. As an example of such a framework, I briefly outline the assemblage theory of morality and ethics that I have developed elsewhere. The assemblage approach, in turn, reveals that the ontological assumptions made by the dominant moral theories are inadequate for such an approach. Thus, I propose an ontology of relational-being characterized by attunement and fidelity, which, in turn, strongly suggests the necessity of moving beyond traditional moral concepts such as good and evil.