Agricultural production amid conflict: Separating the effects of conflict into shocks and uncertainty

Arias, Maria A.; Ibáñez, Ana María; Zambrano, Andrés

doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.11.011

Cited by 105 publications

(73 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…Such outcomes, which include height‐for‐age Z‐score (HAZ), weight‐for‐age Z‐score (WAZ) and weight‐for‐height measures, are then directly linked to food insecurity (Martin‐Shields and Stojetz 2018). More direct measures of conflict‐driven food insecurity include food expenses (Verwimp and Muñoz‐Mora 2018), household consumption patterns (Serneels and Verpoorten 2015), crop and livestock portfolios (Rockmore 2012), calorie intake (D'souza and Jolliffe 2013), and farmers’ investment decisions (Arias, Ibáñez, and Zambrano 2018).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For such households, armed conflicts present an additional shock to which they often respond by smoothening their food consumption (Justino 2011). Second, there is evidence that households shift their crop, livestock, and asset portfolios to adopt low‐risk, low‐return coping strategies to survive conflicts (Rockmore 2012; Arias, Ibáñez, and Zambrano 2018). These suggest that households’ dietary diversity and outcomes related to their access to sufficient and nutritious food are affected by conflict.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Armed Conflicts and Food Insecurity: Evidence from Boko Haram's Attacks

George

Adelaja

Weatherspoon

2019

American J Agri Economics

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More than half of the 815 million undernourished people in the world live in countries struggling with conflict, violence and fragility. Conflict can impact food security conditions by destroying agricultural production, distribution and markets, hindering economic growth and increasing unemployment levels. By spatially joining the general household survey (GHS) panel data for Nigeria with Boko Haram terrorist incident data, we estimate the impact of Boko Haram attacks on food security conditions. We find that an increase in conflict intensity, measured by number of fatalities, increases the number of days where the household had to (1) rely on less preferred foods, (2) limit the variety of foods eaten, and (3) limit the portion size of meals consumed. However, the number of days that households went without eating anything, a more severe measure of food insecurity, was not affected. The food consumption score is also negatively affected by conflict. We also find that the conflict-driven food insecurity is mainly materialized through agricultural input and income shocks.

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mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Armed Conflicts and Food Insecurity: Evidence from Boko Haram's Attacks

George

Adelaja

Weatherspoon

2019

American J Agri Economics

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“…This method has increasingly been applied to processed food commodities (e.g., Nevo 2001), but to the best of our knowledge, this paper is a first attempt to employ this methodology to study fresh food markets in the context of violent political conflict in developing economies. Arias et al (2019) examined the effects of conflict on agricultural activities of farmers in Columbia. Rockmore (2015) studied how livestock portfolio and the choice of crops are affected by conflict in Uganda.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effects of violent political conflict on the supply, demand and fragmentation of fresh food markets

et al. 2020

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Violent political conflict has been documented to have comprehensive adverse effects on economic activity and, thus, substantially harm social welfare. As conflict escalations are often reported to fragment economic space, we suggest an empirical framework which allows for estimating changes in the size of markets often split by frontlines. This approach uses a differentiated goods oligopoly model to separate effects of conflict intensity on consumer demand, costs of trade, market size, and market structure. We combine daily sales of apples in Hebron -one of the focal points of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict -and variables quantifying complementary aspects of conflict intensity. Conflict is found to suppress demand and affect competition more significantly than it increases costs of trading. Simulations indicate a 15% reduction in total daily consumption during conflict of high intensity while a pacification would yield a 20% welfare gain. This empirical framework allows disentangling the effects of conflict on food markets. The results suggest that relief policies should consider alleviating effects of fragmentation of economic space, e.g., by ensuring humanitarian corridors.

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“…Their time horizons are shorter than those of democratically elected regimes, leading to little investment in public goods and more effort to redistribute assets to NSAA members and their network of supporters Persson 2009, 2010). The decision of NSAAs to regulate economic activity and to engage in asset redistribution-not necessarily to the most productive households in the community but via patronage links-is not aimed at increasing aggregate efficiency (Acemoglu et al 2011;Arias et al 2019;Besley and Persson 2009;Bozzoli and Brück 2009;Rockmore 2016;Serneels and Verpoorten 2015;Singh 2012;Verpoorten 2009). For example, NSAAs force households in some regions to cultivate food crops for combatants or to retrieve them from certain markets (Arias et al 2019;Brück 2004;Cassar et al 2013;Serneels and Verpoorten 2015;Singh 2012;Wood 2003).…”

Section: Migration Weather Shocks and The Legacies Of Rebelocracymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In imposing rebelocracy, NSAAs control civilian affairs, provide security and public goods, adjudicate disputes, collect taxes, and regulate economic activities (Arjona 2014(Arjona , 2016Sanchez de la Sierra 2013;Wood 2003;Wood 2010). This generates incentives for households to invest in expanding agricultural production and accumulating wealth, and a higher income for armed groups to tax (Arias et al 2019;Persson 2009, 2010;Olson 1993;Sanchez de la Sierra 2013). Although a large literature has studied the economic impacts of violence, this is the first paper to examine the economic legacies of wartime institutions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The effects of wartime institutions on households’ ability to cope with shocks: Evidence for Colombia

Arteaga¹,

Campo²,

Arjona³

et al. 2019

WIDER Working Paper

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.Abstract: This paper studies the legacies of wartime institutions, measured as rebelocracy, on the ability of households to cope with negative income shocks. Rebelocracy is the social order established by non-state armed actors in the communities they control. By providing public goods and a predictable framework within which to operate, rebelocracy may generate incentives for households to expand production and accumulate wealth, placing them in a higher income trajectory than households living in war zones amid violence and chaos. If these better economic conditions persist after non-state armed actors leave the territory, households in communities that had stronger rebelocracy levels will be better able to cope with negative income shocks. The empirical strategy identifies households' responses to random weather shocks and estimates their heterogeneous impact by the level of rebelocracy. Using a household panel in four conflict regions in Colombia, the estimation controls for time-invariant unobservables. The study finds that in regions with strong rebelocracy, households are better able to cope with negative weather shocks than those living in regions with non-state armed actor presence but with limited or no intervention. The former households face a lower economic impact of weather shocks and resort less to survival migration. The effect of rebelocracy is driven mostly by the provision of public goods by non-state armed actors. While this paper is not claiming causal impacts of rebelocracy, its coefficient estimates are robust to controlling for confounders that may explain rebelocracy in the first place.

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Agricultural production amid conflict: Separating the effects of conflict into shocks and uncertainty

Cited by 105 publications

References 36 publications

Armed Conflicts and Food Insecurity: Evidence from Boko Haram's Attacks

Armed Conflicts and Food Insecurity: Evidence from Boko Haram's Attacks

Effects of violent political conflict on the supply, demand and fragmentation of fresh food markets

The effects of wartime institutions on households’ ability to cope with shocks: Evidence for Colombia

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