2005
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.868646
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Aid Programs' Unintended Effects: The Case of Progresa and Migration

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Cited by 5 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…Conditional policies compel recipients to pursue certain actions in order to receive the transfer: in other words a “pre‐commitment.” If potential recipients want to receive the subsidy, they need to demonstrate that they have complied with the conditions that make them eligible to receive it, just as our theory predicts. As previous works have shown (Angelucci, 2004, 2005; Stecklov et al., ), this conditionality translates into a decreased likelihood of migration. In contrast, unconditional programs such as Procampo, especially when transfer amounts are small, do not provide enough incentives for some recipients to remain in place, and thus tend to contribute to increased migration.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 72%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Conditional policies compel recipients to pursue certain actions in order to receive the transfer: in other words a “pre‐commitment.” If potential recipients want to receive the subsidy, they need to demonstrate that they have complied with the conditions that make them eligible to receive it, just as our theory predicts. As previous works have shown (Angelucci, 2004, 2005; Stecklov et al., ), this conditionality translates into a decreased likelihood of migration. In contrast, unconditional programs such as Procampo, especially when transfer amounts are small, do not provide enough incentives for some recipients to remain in place, and thus tend to contribute to increased migration.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 72%
“…Using randomized data from Progresa (now known as Oportunidades —“Opportunities”)—a conditional cash transfer program implemented by the Mexican government with the aim of reducing poverty—Stecklov, Winters, Stampini, and Davis () and Angelucci (2004, 2005) show that on average, Progresa tended to reduce migration levels. Assistance provided by Progresa was dependent upon the recipients' adherence to a particular set of conditions.…”
Section: International Migration and State Policies: Theoretical Consmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the first domain (economic opportunities and decent work), we found evidence clusters for the intervention categories relating to human capital strengthening (n = 41) and active labor market policies (n = 16). Human capital strengthening interventions are predominantly represented by cash transfer schemes-for example, large universal programs such as Mexico's PROGRESA (Angelucci 2005;Stecklov et al 2005;Tirado-Alcaraz 2014;Araujo and Macours 2021), other targeted cash transfers offered seasonally (Sibson 2020), or humanitarian cash transfers (Özler et al 2021).…”
Section: Evidence Gaps Exist Within Many Intervention Categoriesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The empirical literature so far only consists of the analyses that use income shocks generated by conditional cash transfers to answer this question. For example, Stecklov et al (2005) and Angelucci (2015) have tested the theory by studying the impact of a Mexican conditional cash transfer program ( Progresa ) on migration. Their conclusions are conflicting — while Stecklov et al (2005) found that Progresa reduced migration to the United States, Angelucci (2015) found that the transfer actually increased migration (both total and labor).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%