Aiming at Virtue in Plato

Abstract

This study of Plato's ethics focuses on the concept of virtue. Based on detailed readings of the most prominent Platonic dialogues on virtue, it argues that there is a central yet previously unnoticed conceptual distinction in Plato between the idea of virtue as the supreme aim of one's actions and the determination of which action-tokens or -types are virtuous. Appreciating the 'aiming/determining distinction' provides detailed and mutually consistent readings of the most well-known Platonic dialogues on virtue as well as original interpretations of central Platonic questions. Unlike most examinations of Plato's ethics, this study does not take as its centrepiece the 'eudaimonist framework', which focuses on the relationship between virtue and happiness. Instead, it argues that the dialogues themselves begin with the idea of the supremacy of virtue, examine how that claim can be defended, and address how to determine what constitutes the virtuous action.

Love: self-propagation, self-preservation, orekstasis?

“…13. For excellent discussion of this and the Crito passage mentioned in my next note, see Chapter 2 (especially 2.1 and 2.5) of Vasiliou (2008). 14.…”

WhySocrates Does Not Request Exile in theApology

“…Because he has said, ‘to fear death, gentlemen, is nothing else than to think one is wise when one is not’ (29a5–6), he would not be held back by the mere fact that he would be put to death. Indeed, if he were to let the possibility of his death prevent him from responding justly, then he would be in violation of the principle at 28b6–d4 that we should not think about death or any other consequence but only about whether or not we are acting justly . Thus it must be that the last part of the sentence shows the reason it was a good thing that the voice held him back: its goodness must be a result of the fact that it held him back from undertaking a course of action which would have done no good to him or to the city .…”

“…Otherwise, he could accomplish some good in the time interval between then and when he was put to death, and the fact that he might avoid being killed by refraining from entering politics would no longer be of any significance – this avoidance of being killed (1) not being worthy to be treated as a good‐in‐itself and (2) no longer being a means to the further end of avoiding not doing any good at all. Socrates proceeds to assert the exact premise that is required to make his argument valid: ‘A man who fights for justice, if he is to preserve his life for even a little while , must be a private citizen, not a public man’ (32a1–3) . While this premise is strong enough to prove his conclusion, the argument remains unsound, for the premise is clearly too strong to be true: even a member of Stalin's secret police would be very likely to survive for a few moments after fighting for justice .…”

The Guise of the Beautiful: Symposium 204d ff.

“…Kraut 2017 cautions against importing an Aristotelian framework of eudaimonia; cf. Vasiliou 2007. of beauty best accomplishes this end (209e5-212c2). Clearly, beauty and the good are closely related.…”