Air Force Installation Energy Assurance: An Assessment Framework

Abstract

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Extreme Weather and Climate Hazard Impacts on Energy and Water Utilities: Implications for Department of the Air Force Installation Climate Resilience Planning

“…3 Completed in fiscal year (FY) 2020; see Narayanan, Lostumbo, et al (2021). 4 Completed in FY 2016 and FY 2018; see Narayanan et al (2017) and Narayanan et al (2019). 5 Completed in FY 2019; see Narayanan, Van Abel, et al (2021).…”

Deterring Attacks Against the Power Grid: Two Approaches for the U.S. Department of Defense

“…These interventions are distinct from inside-the-fence options for boosting DoD's electric power resilience, such as backup generators and uninterruptible power supply systems, which also play important roles in power resilience. The cost-benefit calculus for determining which inside-the-fence investments to make and when to make them involves (1) such complexities as scaling backup systems to match the critical load demanded over time and (2) uncertainties around the frequency and severity of outages (Narayanan et al, 2017). But this cost-benefit calculus is better understood than the cost-benefit calculus for determining the optimal collection of outside-the-fence actions for DoD to pursue.…”

“…These include backup power-generation sources, such as fixed and mobile generators, combined with uninterruptible power-supply systems. One challenge with this approach is that reliance on fuelbased generators makes long outages that disrupt fuel delivery services particularly problematic (Narayanan et al, 2017). There has also been significant interest in microgrids and a wide variety of types of oninstallation electric power production.…”

“…We define resilience as a system's ability to withstand and recover from a particular disruption(Narayanan et al, 2017). For some missions, resilience might mean never being offline; that is, to withstand a disruption might mean ensuring that operations are continuously sustained throughout the course of a disruption.…”

“…In addition, we distinguish between mission resilience and power resilience because mission resilience can be achieved in a variety of ways, not all of which involve investments in power resilience. Note that a closely related concept is robustness, which we define as DoD's ability to withstand and recover from a diverse set of disruptions( Narayanan, et al, 2017). Robustness can be thought of as the extent to which a system is resilient across a wide array of disruptions.8 Deterring Attacks Against the Power Grid: Two Approaches for DoD…”