Air Pollution Regulations in China: A Policy Simulation Approach with Evolutionary Game

Chu, Zhaopeng; Bian, Chen; Yang, Jun

doi:10.35784/pe.2022.1.20

Cited by 8 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…The government's penalties for emissions from high-carbon enterprises are referenced from the research data of Zhou et al [32] and Lin et al [57]. The coefficients of low-carbon input and output for both enterprise entities, denoted as α and β, are referenced from the initial values in the study by Chu et al [58]. The basic profits, V i (i = 1, 2), and low-carbon investment costs, C i (i = 1, 2), associated with maintaining the original production mode for both enterprises are set based on the research by Mörsdorf et al [59].…”

Section: Parameter Sources and Settingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impacts of Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism on the Development of Chinese Steel Enterprises and Government Management Decisions: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis

Tian,

Zheng,

Liu

et al. 2024

Sustainability

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Upon the implementation of the European Union Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), substantial challenges are anticipated to impact the international trade of Chinese steel products. To safeguard the competitiveness of Chinese steel products on the global stage, this paper establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model, involving large steel enterprises, small- and medium-sized steel enterprises, and the government. The model integrates collaborative emission reduction and free-riding benefits among enterprises, along with the government’s dynamic subsidies and penalties. First, we calculate the replicator dynamic equations and conduct stability analysis to obtain the evolutionary trends and system equilibrium points in different phases of the CBAM. Then, we validate the evolutionary theoretical analysis of the model through example simulation analysis. Finally, we explore the impact of different parameters on the agents through a sensitivity analysis of parameters. The findings indicate that (1) large enterprises demonstrate greater sensitivity to CBAM, making their production structures more susceptible to changes in CBAM policies; (2) small- and medium-sized enterprises are more prone to free-riding behavior influence; (3) government intervention should be kept within appropriate boundaries, as excessive intervention may lead to strategic oscillation, with passive management being chosen by the government during the strengthening phase of CBAM; (4) elevating the price in the Chinese carbon market would slow down the structural changes in the production of Chinese steel enterprises, serving as an effective measure to counteract the impacts of CBAM. This paper provides theoretical support for how steel enterprises and the government can respond to CBAM, aiding stakeholders in selecting optimal strategies during different implementation stages and mitigating the impacts of the CBAM to the maximum extent possible.

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Section: Parameter Sources and Settingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impacts of Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism on the Development of Chinese Steel Enterprises and Government Management Decisions: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis

Tian,

Zheng,

Liu

et al. 2024

Sustainability

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The government's penalties for emissions from highcarbon enterprises are referenced from the research data of Zhou et al [17] and Lin et al [42]. The coefficients of low-carbon input and output for both enterprise entities, denoted as α and β, are referenced from the initial values in the study by Chu et al [43]. The basic profits Vi(i=1,2) and lowcarbon investment costs Ci(i=1,2) associated with maintaining the original production mode for both enterprises are set based on the research by Mörsdorf et al [44].…”

Section: Parameter Sources and Settingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impacts of Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism on the Development of Chinese Steel Enterprises and Government Management Decisions: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis

Tian,

Zheng,

Pan

et al. 2024

Preprint

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Upon the implementation of the European Union Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), substantial challenges are anticipated to impact the international trade of Chinese steel products. To safeguard the competitiveness of Chinese steel products on the global stage, this paper establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model, involving large steel enterprises, small and medium-sized steel enterprises, and the government. The model integrates collaborative emission reduction and free-riding benefits among enterprises, along with the government's dynamic subsidies and penalties. The paper analyzes the evolutionary trends and stable states of the three parties during different stages of CBAM, including a sensitivity analysis of key parameters. The findings indicate that large enterprises demonstrate a heightened sensitivity to CBAM, while small and medium-sized enterprises are more significantly influenced by free-riding benefits. Government intervention should be strategically timed and incline towards passive management during the strengthening phase of CBAM. Additionally, the refinement of the Chinese carbon market emerges as an effective means to counter CBAM. This paper provides theoretical support for how steel enterprises and the government can respond to CBAM, aiding stakeholders in selecting optimal strategies during different implementation stages and mitigating the impacts of CBAM to the maximum extent possible.

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“…Most scholars believe that Internet regulation is a stricter regulation instrument. But some scholars argue that it lacks flexibility (Chu et al, 2022).…”

Section: The Influence Of Traditional and Internet Regulation On Low-...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Can Internet regulation encourage companies to produce low-carbon products? — The effective stability of Internet supervision and punishment mechanism

Wang

2023

Preprint

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Because of the short-term diseconomies and externalities of low-carbon products, effective government intervention becomes a necessary tool for enterprises to produce low-carbon products. Under government regulation, a dynamic evolutionary game model is used for theoretical analysis. And the case data of new energy vehicle enterprises are used for simulation to explore the implementation effects of different punishment mechanisms on enterprises' production of low-carbon products. The results show that: (i) in the game between government and enterprises, consumers' green preferences, the differentiation between low-carbon products and high-carbon products, including the difference in cost and environmental friendliness, the market demand, and the purchase cost are important factors affecting game strategies. (ii) Under traditional regulatory, both the static and dynamic penalty mechanisms are favorable for enterprises to adopt the strategy of producing low-carbon products. What' more, the stronger the penalty, the faster the enterprises transform to produce low-carbon products. (iii) Under Internet regulatory, the strong dynamic penalty mechanism can better promote enterprises to produce low-carbon products, while the static penalty mechanism can't promote enterprises to produce low-carbon products effectively. On this basis, it is suggested that while regulating enterprises' production behavior, the government could also increase the demand for green consumption to pull enterprises to produce low-carbon products. In addition, it is suggested that the government's regulatory approach should be matched with the penalty mechanism, and the synergistic effect among regulatory instruments should be skillfully utilized, so as to promote the process of sustainable social development.

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Air Pollution Regulations in China: A Policy Simulation Approach with Evolutionary Game

Cited by 8 publications

References 35 publications

Impacts of Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism on the Development of Chinese Steel Enterprises and Government Management Decisions: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis

Impacts of Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism on the Development of Chinese Steel Enterprises and Government Management Decisions: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis

Impacts of Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism on the Development of Chinese Steel Enterprises and Government Management Decisions: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis

Can Internet regulation encourage companies to produce low-carbon products? — The effective stability of Internet supervision and punishment mechanism

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