Airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2 lineage B.1.617.2 (Delta variant) within a tightly monitored isolation facility

Fox‐Lewis, Andrew; Williamson, Felicity; Harrower, Jay; Ren, Xiaoyun; Sonder, Gerard J.B.; McNeill, Andrea; Ligt, Joep de; Geoghegan, Jemma L.

doi:10.1016/j.pathol.2021.12.103

Cited by 2 publications

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“…Explanations for our negative results are that there was no infectious virus in the environment at the time of the samplings or that current methods were not sensitive enough to detect it. As SARS-CoV-2 is efficiently transmitted in hospital wards and between family members, 113,114 even from quarantine room to another via corridor and similarly timed door opening, 115 we conclude that the methodology is likely too unsensitive. 116 A significant loss of infective viruses in air sampling has also been demonstrated, [117][118][119][120][121][122][123] and current impaction and impingement sampling methods have low collection efficiency for small, nanometer-sized particles.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 88%

SARS‐CoV‐2 indoor environment contamination with epidemiological and experimental investigations

et al. 2022

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SARS‐CoV‐2 has been detected both in air and on surfaces, but questions remain about the patient‐specific and environmental factors affecting virus transmission. Additionally, more detailed information on viral sampling of the air is needed. This prospective cohort study (N = 56) presents results from 258 air and 252 surface samples from the surroundings of 23 hospitalized and eight home‐treated COVID‐19 index patients between July 2020 and March 2021 and compares the results between the measured environments and patient factors. Additionally, epidemiological and experimental investigations were performed. The proportions of qRT‐PCR‐positive air (10.7% hospital/17.6% homes) and surface samples (8.8%/12.9%) showed statistical similarity in hospital and homes. Significant SARS‐CoV‐2 air contamination was observed in a large (655.25 m3) mechanically ventilated (1.67 air changes per hour, 32.4–421 L/s/patient) patient hall even with only two patients present. All positive air samples were obtained in the absence of aerosol‐generating procedures. In four cases, positive environmental samples were detected after the patients had developed a neutralizing IgG response. SARS‐CoV‐2 RNA was detected in the following particle sizes: 0.65–4.7 μm, 7.0–12.0 μm, >10 μm, and <100 μm. Appropriate infection control against airborne and surface transmission routes is needed in both environments, even after antibody production has begun.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 88%

SARS‐CoV‐2 indoor environment contamination with epidemiological and experimental investigations

et al. 2022

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“…Persons B, C, and D subsequently tested positive but genomic sequencing linked their viral sequences not to the infected person within their travel group (E), but to person A across the corridor. Closed-circuit television (CCTV) showed room doors were opened in short succession of each other, making airborne transmission the most plausible explanation [8].…”

Section: Person-to-person Genomic Linksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Person-to-person Genomic Linksmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Similarly, transmission within MIQ facilities was shifting the balance of probability away from fomites to aerosols [7,8]. For example, solo traveller A and a 5-person travel group, BCDEF, travelled to New Zealand on different flights from different countries, arrived on different dates, and were housed in different MIQ hotels [8]. While asymptomatic, person A tested positive at their routine day 1 test and was transferred to the Managed Isolation Facility (MIF) on 19 July 2021 and placed in room 277.…”

Section: Person-to-person Genomic Linksmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Exploring the depth and breadth of the genomics toolbox during the COVID-19 pandemic: Insights from Aotearoa New Zealand.

Wiles

Bunce²,

Geoghegan³

et al. 2022

Preprint

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Genomic technologies have become routine in the surveillance and monitoring of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, as evidenced by the millions of SARS-CoV-2 sequences uploaded to the Global Initiative on Sharing Avian Influenza Data (GISAID). Yet the ways in which these technologies have been applied to manage the pandemic are varied. Aotearoa New Zealand was one of a small number of countries to adopt an elimination strategy for COVID-19, establishing a hotel-based managed isolation and quarantine system for all international arrivals. To aid our response, we rapidly set up and scaled our use of genomic technologies to help identify community cases of COVID-19, to understand how they had arisen, and to determine the appropriate action to maintain elimination. Once New Zealand pivoted from elimination to suppression as a strategy in late 2021, our genomic response changed to focusing on identifying new variants arriving at the border, tracking their incidence around the country, and examining any links between specific variants and increased disease severity. Here we explore New Zealand's genomic journey through the pandemic and discuss the lessons learned for how we should continue to respond to COVID-19 and how we should prepare for future pandemics.

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Airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2 lineage B.1.617.2 (Delta variant) within a tightly monitored isolation facility

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

SARS‐CoV‐2 indoor environment contamination with epidemiological and experimental investigations

SARS‐CoV‐2 indoor environment contamination with epidemiological and experimental investigations

Exploring the depth and breadth of the genomics toolbox during the COVID-19 pandemic: Insights from Aotearoa New Zealand.

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