Airline alliances—who benefits?

Morrish, Sussie; Hamilton, Robert T.

doi:10.1016/s0969-6997(02)00041-8

Cited by 94 publications

(59 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…S.C. Morrish and R.T. Hamilton (2002) examines some 15 years of alliance experience and finds no conclusive evidence that alliance membership has yielded monopoly profits to the airlines. Improvements in terms of load factors and general productivity levels have, for the most part, been accompanied by fare reductions of similar magnitude, resulting in only modest gains to the carriers [7].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on the Driving Factors of Corporate and Loyalty Program Partnerships

Min¹,

Qin²

2016

Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Electronic, Mechanical, Information and Management Society

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With increased liberalization in markets, the intensity of competition has increased amongst all of companies, such as bank industry and air carriers. These companies have responded to the competitive pressure in many ways, one of which has been the formation of Loyalty Program Partnerships. The main goal of the alliance is that all businesses can benefit from it. This paper focuses on four factors that drive the companies join the Loyalty Program Partnerships. These are political factor, economic factor, strategic development factor, competitive factor. We expect to give some advises to company who is planning join the Loyalty Program Partnerships

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on the Driving Factors of Corporate and Loyalty Program Partnerships

Min¹,

Qin²

2016

Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Electronic, Mechanical, Information and Management Society

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“…This trend has been exacerbated by airline alliance development (Morrish & Hamilton, 2002). The key hub to hub trunk links are seeing a rapid increase in operations.…”

Section: Dependence Upon a Single Airline Or Alliance Groupmentioning

confidence: 99%

Industry consolidation and future airline network structures in Europe

Dennis

2005

Journal of Air Transport Management

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A__hs!ra_ _ctIn the current downaa'n in demand for air travel, major airlines are revising and rationalising their networks in an attempt to improve financial performance and strengthen their defences against both new entrants and traditional rivals. Expansion of commercial agreements or alliances with other airlines has become a key reaction to the increasingly competitive marketplace. In the absence, for regulatory reasons, of cross-border mergers these are the principal means by which the industry can consolidate internationally. The failure of airlines such as Sabena and Swlssair has also enforced restructuring at some of Europe's busier airports. This paper analyses the developments which have been taking place and attempts to itentify the implications for airline network _s and the function of different hub airports.Airlines have rationalised their networks by withdrawing services that feed the hubs of rival alliances. New ;links have however _ created hthatare made feasible by the alliance support. The range of services available to passengers in long-haul markets to/from Europe is evaluated before and after recent industry reorganisation.Hubs are crucial to interlink the route networks of parmers in an alliance. However, duplication between nearby hub airports that find themselves within the same airline alliance can lead to loss of service at the weaker locations. The extent to which the alliance hubs in Europe duplicate or complement each other in terms of network coverage is assessed and this methodology also enables the optimal partnerships for kmattached' airlines to be identified. The future role of the various European hubs is considered under different scenarios of global alliance development.The paper concludes by considering poss_le longer-term developments. In an environment where the low-cost carriers will provide a major element of customer choice, it is suggested that the traditional airlines will retrench around their hubs, surrendering many secondary cities to the low-cost sector. Further reduction in the number of alliances could threaten more of the European hubs. For both regulatory and commercial reasons, the end result may be just one airline alliance -so recreating in the deregulated market the historic rule of IATA.

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“…Indeed, we see that even platform leaders such as SAP, Oracle, and Microsoft, who have a great amount of required supply-side resources engage in alliances for the purposes of component interoperability with other vendors. It is however not clear if alliances are generally as beneficial such as in the airline sector where code-sharing alliances are formed to satisfy unserved sectors (Brueckner 2001, Morrish andHamilton 2002), or in the semiconductor industry where costly technological knowhow is a reason for interfirm partnerships (Appleyard 1996, Hart andEstrin 1991).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Alliances, Rivalry, and Firm Performance in Enterprise Systems Software Markets: A Social Network Approach

Chellappa

Saraf

2010

Information Systems Research

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E nterprise systems software (ESS) is a multibillion dollar industry that produces systems components to support a variety of business functions for a widerange of vertical industry segments. Even if it forms the core of an organization's information systems (IS) infrastructure, there is little prior IS research on the competitive dynamics in this industry. Whereas economic modeling has generally provided the methodological framework for studying standards-driven industries, our research employs social network methods to empirically examine ESS firm competition. Although component compatibility is critical to organizational end users, there is an absence of industry-wide ESS standards and compatibility is ensured through interfirm alliances. First, our research observes that this alliance network does not conform to the equilibrium structures predicted by economics of network evolution supporting the view that it is difficult to identify dominant standards and leaders in this industry. This state of flux combined with the multifirm multicomponent nature of the industry limits the direct applicability of extant analytical models. Instead, we propose that the relative structural position acquired by a firm in its alliance network is a reasonable proxy for its standards dominance and is an indicator of its performance. In lieu of structural measures developed mainly for interpersonal networks, we develop a measure of relative firm prominence specifically for the business software network where benefits of alliances may accrue through indirect connections even if attenuated. Panel data analyses of ESS firms that account for over 95% of the industry revenues, show that our measure provides a superior model fit to extant social network measures. Two interesting counterintuitive findings emerge from our research. First, unlike other software industries compatibility considerations can trump rivalry concerns. We employ quadratic assignment procedure to show that firms freely form alliances even with their rivals. Second, we find that smaller firms enjoy a greater value from acquiring a higher structural position as compared to larger firms.

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Airline alliances—who benefits?

Cited by 94 publications

References 16 publications

Research on the Driving Factors of Corporate and Loyalty Program Partnerships

Research on the Driving Factors of Corporate and Loyalty Program Partnerships

Industry consolidation and future airline network structures in Europe

Alliances, Rivalry, and Firm Performance in Enterprise Systems Software Markets: A Social Network Approach

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