Alcohol policy, multi-level governance and corporate political strategy: The campaign for Scotland’s minimum unit pricing in Edinburgh, London and Brussels

Abstract

The Scottish government’s plans for a minimum unit price for alcohol were vehemently opposed by the alcohol industry leading to a 6-year delay in implementation after legislation was passed. This article seeks to explain the consequences of devolution and European Union membership for the development of minimum unit price in Scotland through the concepts of multi-level governance, veto points and venue shifting. Systems of multi-level governance create policy interdependencies between settings, an increased number of veto points at which policies can be blocked, and the potential for policy actors to shift decision-making to forums where favourable outcomes are more likely to be attained. In the minimum unit price debates, the alcohol industry engaged in multiple forms of venue shifting and used regulatory compliance procedures and legal challenges at the EU level to try to prevent and delay the policy. This has led to a ‘chilling effect’ on subsequent alcohol policy developments across the United Kingdom.

The emperor has no clothes: a synthesis of findings from the Transformative Research on the Alcohol industry, Policy and Science research programme

“…The backdrop was the longer‐running effort to adopt MUP in Scotland; there we examined industry strategies that successfully delayed implementation, including early and ongoing threats of the prospect of litigation [ 32 ]. These strategies included seizing numerous opportunities to block policies within the European Union’s multi‐level system of governance [ 33 ]. In Scotland [ 32 ], as in England, in the revision of low‐risk drinking guidelines [ 34 ] partnership rhetoric was cast aside and an adversarial, even threatening, posture was adopted when the industry’s interests were compromised.…”

“Using information to shape perception”: tobacco industry documents study of the evolution of Corporate Affairs in the Miller Brewing Company

“…The literature on how the tobacco companies have sought to shape processes of globalisation to advance their interests is most developed [ 93 , 94 ]. The alcohol policy implications of the evolution of multi-level governance regimes and alcohol company responses have begun to be studied [ 95 , 96 ]. Opposing effective policy measures entails disregard for the disease, violence, injury, and death caused by use of alcohol products, other than as presenting issues to be managed along the way, and viewing the scientific study of these issues as a threat to business interests.…”

Think big about developing the science

“…As Adams et al [1] outline, there is cross-ownership between cannabis and other legal drugs and it is not surprising that the tobacco and alcohol 'playbooks' are being employed by the transnational corporations (TNC) producing cannabis with the clear aim of expanding the global market via greater availability, affordability and marketing of cannabis products. Despite some restrictions, the cannabis industry is already marketing its products on digital platforms [5,6]. The goal of marketing is to normalize the use of cannabis products, recruit new…”

“…They have extensive resources and are adept at using them to advance their own business interests. They also possess advanced understanding of complex political systems and how to navigate them [ 6 ]. Drug legalization debates are weaker if they ignore the scope for large alcohol and tobacco companies to diversify and advance their interests politically by infiltrating new markets, with detrimental consequences for public health [ 7 ].…”