Alevi “Openings” and Politicization of the “Alevi Issue” During the AKP Rule

Abstract

This article reviews recent government efforts to address the "Alevi issue" and identify their successes and failures. It demonstrates that the "Alevi openings" constituted paradoxical processes: tracing various components of the "openings" through news media, it shows that, on one hand, they enabled the "Alevi issue" to be brought to public attention. On the other hand, once Alevis were made more visible in public, non-sympathizers could mobilize their representation for their own ends. These empirical findings have profound theoretical implications. They show that "discursive claims of democratization" at the state level do not necessarily result in democratic mechanisms, which can resolve the demands of a pluralistic civil society. The author argues that what she calls the "tutelary secularism" in Turkey, in other words, the management and disciplining of religious groups, continues under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) rule. This model not only fails, but also produces new sources of conflict in Turkey.The growing literature on Alevis in Turkey generally starts with a statement about who the Alevis are, how many Alevis currently reside in the country, which cities they live in and which languages they speak. These rather hackneyed introductions stem from the fact that discussions about Alevis in Turkey have been visible in the public sphere only in the last few decades, 1 a time that is commonly known and referred as the "Alevi revival" 2 or the "Alevi renaissance". 3 Throughout the history of the Turkish Republic, the founding People's Republican Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) has not played an active role toward the Alevis, a group that has constituted a large segment of its electorate, in the name of "separating religion from politics". 4 Furthermore, the newly established state executed excessive measures (referred to in the literature as a massacre or genocide) in the Dersim region in 1937 -38. 5 Alevis' faith-related demands (from hereon, referred to as the "Alevi issue") were brought into public discussion for the first time, ironically, by the conservative Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP).

Limits of post‐secularism in Turkey: Comparing the attitudes of the Justice and Development Party towards the headscarf and Alevi issues

“…In the last decades, the Alevis started to struggle for their distinctive identity and search for meeting their demands in the public sphere. As an attempt of response to this rising struggle, in 2008, the AKP initiated the “Alevi Opening” with “Alevi Workshops.” As Özkul (, p. 85) notes,

The workshops had a top‐down statist perspective since its inception. They were organised by the State Minister Faruk Çelik and an Assistant Professor Necdet Subaşı, who since 2011 has been an employee at the Diyanet 's Strategy Development Presidency appointed by the government.

…”

“…The Alevis' demands are mainly about the position of the Diyanet , compulsory religious courses, recognition of cemevi s as the places of worship (Özkul, , p. 85). These kinds of demands challenge the conservative Sunni‐Hanafi identity of the AKP.…”

“…“As a conservative party, the AKP had to walk a tightrope between not offending the Sunni‐Hanafi segments of its electorate and not causing alienation within its party ranks, at the same time tackling the grievances of the Alevi community” (Bardakçı, , p. 350). The workshops did not persuade the Alevis of the AKP's sincerity since the final declarations openly reflected the dominant Sunni perspective conflicting with the demands of the Alevis (Özkul, , p. 86). The AKP tried to impose a paternalistic approach to the Alevi issue by playing on the divergences between the Alevi nongovernmental organisations (Özkul, , p. 86).…”

“…The workshops did not persuade the Alevis of the AKP's sincerity since the final declarations openly reflected the dominant Sunni perspective conflicting with the demands of the Alevis (Özkul, , p. 86). The AKP tried to impose a paternalistic approach to the Alevi issue by playing on the divergences between the Alevi nongovernmental organisations (Özkul, , p. 86). The seemingly sectarian attitude towards Syria crisis has repercussions on the Alevi opening as well:

The “openings” came to a standstill at the time the AKP government criticised the Assad regime in Syria by highlighting the rule of Alawites.

…”

“…The official discussion of whether Turkey should be involved in the Syrian civil war made Alawites in Syria an external threat and Alevis in Turkey an internal threat and possible targets for political manipulation. (Özkul, , p. 91)…”