Algebraic Attacks on RFID Protocols

Deursen, Ton van; Radomirović, Saša

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-03944-7_4

Cited by 56 publications

(76 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…However, CRC is a homomorphism function and CRC(a ⊕ b) = CRC(a) ⊕ CRC(b). This property leads to a fundamental algebraic weakness, taking the attention off of CRC-based protocols [10]. Protocols based on PUFs have also been claimed as ultra-lightweight.…”

Section: Related Work and Repeated Weaknessesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The authors in [10], defined 3 attacks and the RFID protocols where each is effective. Their work showed the success of algebraic attacks on protocols based on associative operations, such as triangular functions and modular addition.…”

Section: Weaknesses Of Triangular Function-based Protocolsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The designed functions in the UMAP-and ULAP-type protocols are not strong cryptologic functions, but consist of compositions of weak triangular functions and need to be combined with rotation operation, as outlined in [20,29,31], 2. XOR, mod 2 m addition, and triangular functions are associative operations that are nonresistant to algebraic replay attacks [10,20]; therefore, the messages of a protocol should not be reduced to these operations, 3. The operations follow a weak chain towards the main secret (ID), where intermediary messages are decrypted to capture the terms of the message that contains the ID [20,22,23], 4.…”

Section: Didt Reader Tagmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Mersenne twister-based RFID authentication protocol

Özcanhan¹,

Dalkılıç²

2015

Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci

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Abstract:This work presents an ultra-lightweight, cryptographic, mutual authentication protocol for radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags. The proposed scheme is more secure than its predecessors. The vulnerabilities of previous schemes based on triangular functions and rotation have been demonstrated in traditional and rotational cryptanalysis.In this paper, we summarize the successful attacks on previous schemes and demonstrate further attacks on 3 recent ultra-lightweight protocols. Next, we present a proposal that resists all of the known passive attacks. The proposal obeys the properties and rules of addition-rotation-XOR with constants systems. The proposed scheme inserts parts of advanced encryption standard S-boxes into the temperings of the Mersenne twister, which is used as a deterministic random number generator. The proposal is supported by extensive performance and security analysis. Apart from previous work, our scheme is compared and contrasted against the results of some popular hashing and encryption algorithms, recommended for RFID tags.

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Section: Related Work and Repeated Weaknessesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Weaknesses Of Triangular Function-based Protocolsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Didt Reader Tagmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Mersenne twister-based RFID authentication protocol

Özcanhan¹,

Dalkılıç²

2015

Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci

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“…Song also proposes a set of protocols for secure ownership transfer based on earlier work by Song and Mitchell [6]. However, this set of protocols suffers from the same flaws that are described in Section 5 and by Van Deursen and Radomirović [8].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Secure Ownership and Ownership Transfer in RFID Systems

Deursen

Mauw

Radomirović

et al. 2009

Computer Security – ESORICS 2009

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Abstract. We present a formal model for stateful security protocols. This model is used to define ownership and ownership transfer as concepts as well as security properties. These definitions are based on an intuitive notion of ownership related to physical ownership. They are aimed at RFID systems, but should be applicable to any scenario sharing the same intuition of ownership. We discuss the connection between ownership and the notion of desynchronization resistance and give the first formal definition of the latter. We apply our definitions to existing RFID protocols, exhibiting attacks on desynchronization resistance, secure ownership, and secure ownership transfer.

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“…Since the wireless communication channel is insecure, it can be eavesdropped by an adversary. Hence, each authentication protocol should be designed in a way that the adversary, with reasonable computational capabilities, does not be able to exploit the exchanged messages [7].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Attacks on a Lightweight Mutual Authentication Protocol under EPC C-1 G-2 Standard

Habibi

Alagheband

Aref

2011

Information Security Theory and Practice. Security and Privacy of Mobile Devices in Wireless Communication

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Abstract. Yeh et al. have recently proposed a mutual authentication protocol based on EPC Class-1 Gen.-2 standard. They claim their protocol is secure against adversarial attacks and also provides forward secrecy. In this paper we show that the proposed protocol does not have cited security features properly. A powerful and practical attack is presented on this protocol whereby the whole security of the protocol is broken. Furthermore, Yeh et al.'s protocol does not assure the untraceabilitiy and backwarduntraceabilitiy attributes. We also will propose our revision to safeguard the Yeh et al.'s protocol against cited attacks.

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Algebraic Attacks on RFID Protocols

Cited by 56 publications

References 29 publications

Mersenne twister-based RFID authentication protocol

Mersenne twister-based RFID authentication protocol

Secure Ownership and Ownership Transfer in RFID Systems

Attacks on a Lightweight Mutual Authentication Protocol under EPC C-1 G-2 Standard

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