DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-74619-5_22
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Algebraic Cryptanalysis of 58-Round SHA-1

Abstract: Abstract. In 2004, a new attack against SHA-1 has been proposed by a team leaded by Wang [15]. The aim of this article 1 is to sophisticate and improve Wang's attack by using algebraic techniques. We introduce new notions, namely semi-neutral bit and adjuster and propose then an improved message modification technique based on algebraic techniques. In the case of the 58-round SHA-1, the experimental complexity of our improved attack is 2 31 SHA-1 computations, whereas Wang's method needs 2 34 SHA-1 computation… Show more

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Cited by 18 publications
(13 citation statements)
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“…The first collision attack (of complexity about 2 69 ) on SHA-1 appeared in 2005, together with a series of collision attacks on other hash functions with Xiaoyun Wang as the dominating character. Cryptanalytic results and other observations on SHA-1 appear in [17,30,51,52,80,129,158,159,169,201,215,221].…”
Section: Sha-1mentioning
confidence: 86%
“…The first collision attack (of complexity about 2 69 ) on SHA-1 appeared in 2005, together with a series of collision attacks on other hash functions with Xiaoyun Wang as the dominating character. Cryptanalytic results and other observations on SHA-1 appear in [17,30,51,52,80,129,158,159,169,201,215,221].…”
Section: Sha-1mentioning
confidence: 86%
“…However, for stream ciphers, algebraic attacks [4,14] seem to work fine, as for some public key systems [22,23] and other primitives [37]. We want to note that even round reduced variants of Trivium has escaped all efforts to be broken by purely algebraic methods.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They demonstrate that this technique can be used to solve the hard case of inverting a popular secure hash function and were able to invert MD4 up to 2 rounds and 7 steps in less than 8 hours. In [24], Sugita et al used the Gröbner basis to improve the attack on the 58-round SHA-1 hash function to 2 31 computations instead of 2 34 in Wang's method [25].…”
Section: Modern Algebraic Tools and Their Applications To Cryptographymentioning
confidence: 99%