2020
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-38471-5_7
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Algebraic Cryptanalysis of Variants of Frit

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Cited by 4 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…An earlier version of the Friet-PC permutation, called Frit appeared on eprint in a paper by the same authors as this one [30]. This was soon followed by attacks exploiting weaknesses of Frit in the form of slow increase of algebraic degree through the rounds, by Dobraunig et al [19]. While these attacks did not assume the target use case of authenticated encryption in a duplex-based mode, an attack that was published somewhat later by Qin et al did [25].…”
Section: Design Rationale Of Friet-pcmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…An earlier version of the Friet-PC permutation, called Frit appeared on eprint in a paper by the same authors as this one [30]. This was soon followed by attacks exploiting weaknesses of Frit in the form of slow increase of algebraic degree through the rounds, by Dobraunig et al [19]. While these attacks did not assume the target use case of authenticated encryption in a duplex-based mode, an attack that was published somewhat later by Qin et al did [25].…”
Section: Design Rationale Of Friet-pcmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Here accounts for the 1 or possibly 2 rounds that may be skipped by carefully choosing the cube variables as in [31]. This is what happened in our previous design and was exploited in [19] and [25].…”
Section: Algebraic Degreementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Recently, the permutation FRIT [81] was introduced in which efficient implementation of a faultdetection technique has been considered as a design criteria. Although broken [35], FRIT uses interleaved parity for fault detection which -based on the definition of the underlying code -can guarantee the detection of only single-bit faults.…”
Section: Our Contributionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Several analyses made in the literature [22,20,19] confirm this growth for most ciphers, except when the algebraic degree of the function is close to its maximum. As a result, the number of rounds necessary for security against higher-order differential attacks generally grows logarithmically in the size of F. Different behaviour has been observed for certain non-SPN designs, such as some designs with partial nonlinear layers where the algebraic degree grows exponentially in some (not necessarily integer) value smaller than δ [29].…”
Section: Our Contributionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…One type of optimized interpolation attacks was described in [26], where the authors find attacks on reduced-round versions of LowMC which are more efficient than previous attacks based on key guessing [28]. A similar attack was also used to break the full-round version of the Frit permutation in an Even-Mansour setting [29]. The overall strategy of this interpolation attack is to find a distinguisher (for example a constant sum in the encryption direction in the case of LowMC) with which one attacks the construction by finding the unknown monomials of the sums of the symbolic representations in the inverse direction.…”
Section: Attack On Castmentioning
confidence: 99%