Algorithm design for European electricity market clearing with joint allocation of energy and control reserves

Divenyi, Daniel; Polgari, Beata; Sleisz, Ádám; Sőrés, Péter; Raisz, Dávid

doi:10.1016/j.ijepes.2019.04.006

Cited by 27 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…Our further aim is to analyse the applicability of the proposed method in the case of joint energy-reserve markets, where power and reserves are allocated in the same time, considering combined offers as well [18]. The main motivation in this case is that for appropriate clearing of such markets according to the classical payas-clear methods, a wide set of prices must be defined and used for energy, reserves and combined bids [19].…”

Section: Future Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Two-Sided Price-Decoupled Pay-As-Bid Auction Approach for the Clearing of Day-Ahead Electricity Markets

Csercsik

2020

E3S Web Conf.

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In this paper we propose a possible alternative for conventional pay-as-clear type multiunit auctions commonly used for the clearing of day-ahead power exchanges, and analyse some of its characteristic features in comparison with conventional clearing. In the proposed framework, instead of the concept of the uniform market clearing price, we introduce limit prices separately for supply and demand bids, and in addition to the power balance constraint, we formulate constraints for the income balance of the market. The total traded quantity is used as the objective function of the formulation. The concept is demonstrated on a simple example and is compared to the conventional approach in small-scale market simulations.

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Section: Future Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Two-Sided Price-Decoupled Pay-As-Bid Auction Approach for the Clearing of Day-Ahead Electricity Markets

Csercsik

2020

E3S Web Conf.

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“…In this setup, the capacity that has been committed in one market (e.g., reserve capacity procurement) cannot be offered in the subsequent market (e.g., DA market) [11]. This sequential design often results in a poor price formation, since market participants implicitly include in the reserve capacity price an estimate of the opportunity costs for not participating in the DA market [47][48][49]. Moreover, this sequential design increases the likelihood of an inefficient allocation of generation resources [47].…”

Section: Co-optimization Of Energy and Reservesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Short Term Electricity Market Designs: Identified Challenges and Promising Solutions

Silva-Rodriguez,

Sanjab,

Fumagalli

et al. 2020

Preprint

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The electricity market, which was initially designed for dispatchable power plants and inflexible demand, is being increasingly challenged by new trends, such as the high penetration of intermittent renewables and the transformation of the consumers' energy space. To accommodate these new trends and improve the performance of the market, several modifications to current market designs have been proposed in the literature. Given the vast variety of these proposals, this paper provides a comprehensive investigation of the modifications proposed in the literature as well as a detailed assessment of their suitability for improving market performance under the continuously evolving electricity landscape. To this end, first, a set of criteria for an ideal market design is proposed, and the barriers present in current market designs hindering the fulfillment of these criteria are identified. Then, the different market solutions proposed in the literature, which could potentially mitigate these barriers, are extensively explored. Finally, a taxonomy of the proposed solutions is presented, highlighting the barriers addressed by each proposal and the associated implementation challenges. The outcomes of this analysis show that even though each barrier is addressed by at least one proposed solution, no single proposal is able to address all the barriers simultaneously. In this regard, a future-proof market design must combine different elements of proposed solutions to comprehensively mitigate market barriers and overcome the identified implementation challenges. Thus, by thoroughly reviewing this rich body of literature, this paper introduces key contributions enabling the advancement of the state-of-the-art towards increasingly efficient electricity market.

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“…The emergence of prosumers has changed the structure of the open electricity market. Furthermore, the opening degree of the open electricity power market is continuously improving [9], [10]. The reasonable market mechanism can play a positive role in the development of the competitive power market [11], which is conducive to guiding market participants to make correct decisions and maintaining the stability of market operation [12].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Equilibrium Stability of Asymmetric Evolutionary Games of Multi-Agent Systems With Multiple Groups in Open Electricity Market

Yin

Gao

2020

IEEE Access

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The asymptotically stable equilibrium points of asymmetric evolutionary games for multiple groups with multiple game strategies are obtained. The evolution of four groups and more multiple groups in open electricity market are described by the replicator dynamics. Multiple game strategies of the power generation enterprises in open electricity market are studied. Besides, the corresponding asymptotic stability conditions are given by the Lyapunov stability criterion. INDEX TERMS Asymptotically stable, evolutionary game theory, multiple game strategies, open electricity market.

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Algorithm design for European electricity market clearing with joint allocation of energy and control reserves

Cited by 27 publications

References 40 publications

A Two-Sided Price-Decoupled Pay-As-Bid Auction Approach for the Clearing of Day-Ahead Electricity Markets

A Two-Sided Price-Decoupled Pay-As-Bid Auction Approach for the Clearing of Day-Ahead Electricity Markets

Short Term Electricity Market Designs: Identified Challenges and Promising Solutions

Equilibrium Stability of Asymmetric Evolutionary Games of Multi-Agent Systems With Multiple Groups in Open Electricity Market

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